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A GLOBAL TREATY OVERRIDE?
THE NEW OECD MULTILATERAL TAX




On June 7, 2017, seventy-six countries met in Paris for the official sign-
ing of a new multilateral tax instrument (MLI).1 The text and commentary
of the MLI were published in November 2016 by the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The OECD stated:
The Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related
Measures to Prevent BEPS will implement minimum standards to
counter treaty abuse and to improve dispute resolution mecha-
nisms while providing flexibility to accommodate specific tax
treaty policies. It will also allow governments to strengthen their
tax treaties with other tax treaty measures developed in the
OECD/G20 BEPS Project. . . .
The new instrument will transpose results from the OECD/G20
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (BEPS) into more than
2,000 tax treaties worldwide.2
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thank Kim Brooks, Nir Fishbien, Pasquale Pistone, Omri Marian, Gianluca Mazzoni, Steven
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1. Ground-breaking multilateral BEPS convention signed at OECD will close loop-
holes in thousands of tax treaties worldwide, Org. for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev. [OECD]
(June 7, 2017), http://www.oecd.org/tax/ground-breaking-multilateral-beps-convention-will-
close-tax-treaty-loopholes.htm; see OECD, SIGNATORIES AND PARTIES TO THE MULTILAT-
ERAL CONVENTION TO IMPLEMENT TAX TREATY RELATED MEASURES TO PREVENT BASE
EROSION AND PROFIT SHARING (Dec. 20, 2017), http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/beps-mli-
signatories-and-parties.pdf (listing the countries that have signed the treaty, plus countries
that intend to sign soon). The signatories include the major OECD and EU members (except
for the U.S.), China and India, as well as many important treaty shopping jurisdictions (e.g.,
the Netherlands and Mauritius) and tax havens (e.g., Singapore and Hong Kong). As of Oc-
tober 2017, 71 jurisdictions have signed the MLI but only one (Austria) has ratified it; four
more ratifications are needed for the MLI to enter into force, which is expected to occur by
early 2018.
2. Countries adopt multilateral convention to close tax treaty loopholes and improve
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The OECD went on to explain that:
[t]he multilateral convention was developed over the past year,
via negotiations involving more than 100 jurisdictions including
OECD member countries, G20 countries and other developed
and developing countries, under a mandate delivered by G20 Fi-
nance Ministers and Central Bank Governors at their February
2015 meeting . . . The OECD will be the depositary of the multi-
lateral instrument and will support governments in the process of
its signature, ratification and implementation.3
There is no question that this event represents a milestone in the evolution
of the international tax regime (ITR).4 But it also raises important ques-
tions about the function of tax treaties in the twenty-first century and
whether other steps can be taken to improve the tax treaty network be-
yond the MLI.
To appreciate the importance of the MLI, it is useful to take a step
back and consider its historical significance. Bilateral tax treaties were first
negotiated in the nineteenth century,5 but their importance grew after
World War I because of increased income tax rates and the risk of taxation
by both country of residence and country that sources the income.6 The
result was the publication of the first model bilateral tax treaty under the
auspices of the League of Nations in 1928,7 followed by the Mexico
(1943)8 and London (1946)9 models. The OECD took over from the
League after World War II and published its own bilateral model (based
on the London model) in 1963,10 while the UN published a bilateral model
based on the Mexico model in 1980.11 These models in turn inspired a
network of over three thousand bilateral tax treaties that form the bul-
3. Id.
4. See generally REUVEN AVI-YONAH, ADVANCED INTRODUCTION TO INTERNA-
TIONAL TAX LAW (2015) (discussing the international tax regime). For the importance of the
MLI as a turning point in the evolution of the international tax regime, see A GLOBAL ANAL-
YSIS OF TAX TREATY DISPUTES (Eduardo Baistrocchi ed., 2017).
5. For the history of the pre-World War I bilateral tax treaties, see, e.g., Sunita
Jogarajan, Prelude to the International Tax Treaty Network: 1815–1914 Early Tax Treaties and
the Conditions for Action, 31 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 679 (2011). The first tax treaty was
concluded between Prussia and Saxony in 1869. Id at 696.
6. Bret Wells & Cym H. Lowell, Income Tax Treaty Policy in the 21st Century: Resi-
dence vs. Source, 5 Colum. J. Tax. L. 1, 13 (2013).
7. See Report Presented by the General Meeting of Government Experts on Double
Taxation and Tax Evasion, League of Nations Doc. C.562M.178 1928 II (1928).
8. Model Bilateral Conventions for the Prevention of International Double Taxation
and Fiscal Evasion, League of Nations Doc. C.2.M.2. 1945 II A (1945).
9. Model Bilateral Conventions for the Prevention of International Double Taxation
and Fiscal Evasion, League of Nations Doc. C.88.M.88. 1946 II A. (1946).
10. OECD, Draft double taxation convention on income and capital: report of the
O.E.C.D. Fiscal Committee (1963).
11. U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, U.N. MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION CON-
VENTION BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/102,
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wark of the ITR.12 About eighty percent of the words of any two tax trea-
ties are identical and derive from the OECD or UN models (which are
themselves over eighty percent identical to one another).13
From the beginning, the League of Nations was interested in the possi-
bility of negotiating a multilateral tax treaty, but it concluded that the dif-
ferences among the tax laws of different states were too vast to allow for a
successful negotiation.14 Subsequent efforts to negotiate multilateral tax
treaties also failed.15 Most recently, the European Court of Justice refused
to apply its freedom of movement of capital jurisprudence to force a har-
monization of withholding tax rates among treaties within the EU.16
However, in the academic world as well as in practice, there has been
increasing recognition of the need for a multilateral tax treaty.17 There are
three reasons why a multilateral tax treaty makes more sense than a net-
work of bilateral tax treaties. First, the rise of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and then the WTO after World War II, has
shown that multilateral treaties governing important areas of international
economic law are feasible if space is allowed for reservations (i.e., allowing
countries to opt out of specific provisions). Second, there has been increas-
U.N. Sales No. E.80.XVI.3 (1980). United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention be-
tween Developed and Developing Countries (United Nations, 1980).
12. REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME 5 (2007).
13. Reuven Avi-Yonah, Double Tax Treaties: An Introduction, in THE EFFECT OF
TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 99 (Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs, eds.,
2009); Elliott Ash and Omri Marian, The Making of International Tax Law: Empirical Evi-
dence from Natural Language Processing, NTA Annual Meeting, Philadelphia, November 9,
2017.
14. Eran Lempert, Crossing the Barrier: Towards a Multilateral Tax Treaty (2009) (un-
published J.S.D. dissertation, New York University) (on file with authors).
15. Id. For an early appreciation of the need for a multilateral treaty, see Thomas S.
Adams, International and Interstate Aspects of Double Taxation, 22 PROC. OF THE ANN.
CONF. ON TAX’N UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE NAT’L TAX ASS’N, 192-199 (1929) (“Now, in
the long run, whatever solutions are adopted by different pairs of nations, it is probable that
Nation A in concluding a bi-lateral convention with Nation B will adopt some solution differ-
ent from that which it might adopt in a similar treaty with Nation X. And if this piece-meal
bargaining goes on for twenty years or more, as it is likely to go on, it may possibly result in a
tangle of conflicting solutions applicable to the nationals of different countries, which will be
highly complicated and highly mysterious, and about as bad as the situation that now exists.
In short, there is in my mind, looking to the ‘longer future, the strongest reason for the
adoption of one uniform solution, if we could get it, or the settlement of this problem by a
multilateral convention, in which a large group of nations would adopt the same solutions for
the detailed problems which have to be set.”).
16. Case C-376/03, D v. Inspecteur van Belastingdienst, 2005 E.C.R. I-05821.
17. See, e.g., Kim Brooks, The Potential of Multilateral Tax Treaties, in TAX TREATIES:
BUILDING BRIDGES BETWEEN LAW AND ECONOMICS (Michael Lang et al. eds., 2010); Jung-
hong Kim, A New Age of Multilateralism in International Taxation?, 21 SEOUL TAX L. REV.
227 (2015); Richard L. Reinhold, Some Things That Multilateral Tax Treaties Might Usefully
Do, 57 TAX LAW. 661 (2004); Thomas Rixen, Bilateralism or Multilateralism? The Political
Economy of Avoiding International Double Taxation, 16 EUR. J. OF INT’L REL. 589 (2010);
Victor Thuronyi, International Tax Cooperation and a Multilateral Treaty, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L
L. 1641 (2001).
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ing convergence in the language of the various tax treaties; in particular,
the OECD and UN models have become increasingly similar over time.18
Third, with globalization, tax competition treaty shopping (using treaties
to obtain advantages for non-treaty country residents)19 and “triangular
situations” (problems arising from treaty residents doing business in third
countries in ways that affect the treaty but are not covered by it) have
become far more common.20
The main obstacle to a multilateral tax treaty has always been that
investment flows vary by each pair of countries; therefore, appropriate
withholding tax rates vary as well.21 That is the main reason for the re-
maining differences between the OECD and UN models, because flows
between developed countries are more reciprocal than flows between de-
veloped and developing countries. But even that is changing, as more de-
veloping countries become capital exporters as well as importers.22 In
addition, it has for some time been recognized that it may be possible to
negotiate a multilateral treaty but leave the withholding tax rates to be
settled by bilateral negotiation, as the UN model does.23
The new OECD MLI represents the culmination of this line of think-
ing. It is not a full-fledged multilateral tax convention covering all the ar-
eas that are usually covered by bilateral tax treaties. Instead, it is a global
consensual treaty override designed to apply the results of Base Erosion
and Profit Shifting (BEPS) simultaneously to all the tax treaties where the
countries involved agree. The MLI is implemented by countries signing
and ratifying it according to their usual constitutional norms and then de-
positing the ratification with the OECD.24 Upon ratification, the provi-
sions of the MLI apply to modify the relevant provisions of the bilateral
treaties of each depositing country with other depositing countries that
18. REUVEN SHLOMO AVI-YONAH, NICOLA SARTORI & OMRI MARIAN, GLOBAL PER-
SPECTIVES ON INCOME TAXATION LAW 150 (2011).
19. Reuven Avi-Yonah & C. H. Panayi, Rethinking Treaty Shopping: Lessons for the
European Union, in TAX TREATIES: BUILDING BRIDGES BETWEEN LAW AND ECONOMICS 21
(Michael Lang et al. eds., 2010).
20. EMILY FETT, TRIANGULAR CASES: THE APPLICATION OF BILATERAL INCOME TAX
TREATIES IN MULTILATERAL SITUATIONS (2014).
21. Withholding Tax Rates 2017, DELOITTE (Mar. 2017), https://www2.deloitte.com/
content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-withholding-tax-rates.pdf
22. For an overview of the general trends of participation of developing countries in
world trade, see Comm. on Trade and Dev., Participation of developing countries in World
Trade: Overview of major trends and underlying factors, WTO Doc. WT/COMTD/W/15
(Aug. 16, 1996).
23. See Lempert, supra note 14.
24. Org. for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev. [OECD], Multilateral Convention to Imple-
ment Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent BEPS, art. 27 (June 7, 2017), http://www.oecd
.org/tax/treaties/multilateral-convention-to-implement-tax-treaty-related-measures-to-pre-
vent-BEPS.pdf [hereinafter OECD 2017 MLI]; OECD, Explanatory Statement to the Multi-
lateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent BEPS, ¶ 263, https://
www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/explanatory-statement-multilateral-convention-to-implement-tax-
treaty-related-measures-to-prevent-BEPS.pdf [hereinafter OECD MLI Explanatory
Statement].
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they both designate as “covered tax agreements,” unless there is a reserva-
tion (which is not allowed in some cases involving minimum BEPS
standards).25
One of those minimum standards that has been agreed to by all sev-
enty-one signatories of the MLI is the “primary purpose test” (PPT),
which states:
A [treaty] benefit under the Covered Tax Agreement shall not be
granted in respect of an item of income or capital if it is reasona-
ble to conclude, having regard to all relevant facts and circum-
stances, that obtaining that benefit was one of the principal
purposes of any arrangement or transaction that resulted directly
or indirectly in that benefit, unless it is established that granting
that benefit in these circumstances would be in accordance with
the object and purpose of the relevant provisions of Covered Tax
Agreement.26
The PPT, which was adopted over strenuous opposition from the United
States, may influence treaty interpretation beyond the signatories of the
MLI. In particular, the reference to the “object and purpose” of the tax
treaty should be interpreted in light of the new preamble to the OECD
model, which clarifies that the object and purpose of tax treaties is to pre-
vent both double taxation and double non-taxation.27 This adoption of the
“single tax principle” can have wide-ranging ramifications for the interpre-
tation of tax treaties, and may even impact the United States as a non-
signatory because the prevention of double non-taxation is also incorpo-
rated into the 2016 U.S. model.28
In addition, the new OECD MLI has a wide-ranging dispute resolu-
tion mechanism including mandatory arbitration.29 Mandatory arbitration
has recently been introduced into the OECD and U.S. models,30 but it is
still lacking in the UN model and most actual treaties. The effect of includ-
ing it in the MLI may be to force binding arbitration on many existing
treaties, which is likely to prove controversial.31
25. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note24, ¶ 280.
26. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 7(1).
27. OECD, Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances,
Action 6 – 2015 Final Report 92 (Oct. 5, 2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264241695-en
(“(State A) and (State B) . . . intending to conclude a Convention for the elimination of
double taxation with respect to taxes on income and on capital without creating opportunities
for non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax evasion or avoidance”).
28. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Full Circle: The Single Tax Principle, BEPS, and the New
US Model, 1 GLOBAL TAXATION 12 (2016).
29. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, arts. 18–26.
30. U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION, art.
25, ¶ 6–10, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/Treaty-
US%20Model-2016.pdf; OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, art. 25
(2008), http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/42219418.pdf.
31. Ehab Farah, Mandatory Arbitration of International Tax Disputes: A Solution in
Search of a Problem, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 703 (2008).
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This article will proceed as follows. Section 2 summarizes the main
provisions of the MLI. Section 3 discusses the purpose of tax treaties in the
twenty-first century, because it can be argued that they are less necessary
under conditions of tax competition. Section 4 raises the question whether
tax treaties can be improved short of a full-fledged multilateral tax treaty
by inserting a most favored nation (MFN) provision similar to those found
in bilateral investment treaties. Such an MFN provision operates over time
to create a de facto multilateral treaty without the negotiation of one. Sec-
tion 5 concludes this article.
2. THE NEW OECD MULTILATERAL INSTRUMENT (NEW MLI)
2.1 The Mission of the MLI
The mission of the MLI is described in the preamble as follows:
[T]o ensure swift, co-ordinated and consistent implementation of
the treaty-related BEPS measures in a multilateral context . . . to
ensure that existing agreements for the avoidance of double taxa-
tion on income are interpreted to eliminate double taxation with
respect to the taxes covered by those agreements without creating
opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax
evasion or avoidance (including through treaty-shopping arrange-
ments aimed at obtaining reliefs provided in those agreements for
the indirect benefit of residents of third jurisdictions) . . . to imple-
ment agreed changes in a synchronised and efficient manner
across the network of existing agreements for the avoidance of
double taxation on income without the need to bilaterally renego-
tiate each such agreement.32
In short, the overall mission or purpose of the MLI is to implement tax-
treaty-related BEPS measures in a swift, coordinated, and consistent man-
ner across the network of existing tax treaties (Covered Tax Agreements)
in a multilateral context without bilateral renegotiation of each agreement.
Although tax treaties have played an important role in eliminating
double taxation and facilitating globalization of liberal investment and
trade in past decades, the loopholes and mismatches in existing treaties are
one of the root causes of widespread unregulated BEPS opportunism.33
As a comprehensive response, BEPS Actions 2, 6, 7 and 14 have devel-
oped a series of treaty-related BEPS measures. Action 2 report aims at
neutralizing the effects of hybrid mismatch arrangements.34 Action 6 re-
port aims at preventing the granting of treaty benefits in inappropriate
circumstances.35 Action 7 report aims at preventing the artificial avoid-
32. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, preamble.
33. OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 13 (July 19, 2013), http://
dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264202719-en.
34. See OECD, Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, Action 2 -
2015 Final Report (Oct.5, 2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264241138-en.
35. See OECD, supra note 27.
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ance of Permanent Establishment (PE) (physical presence) status.36 Ac-
tion 14 report aims at making dispute resolution mechanisms more
effective.37
Beyond reflecting the BEPS measures in articles 3 through 26, the
MLI further reinforces the single tax principle by “recognizing the impor-
tance of ensuring that profits are taxed where substantive economic activi-
ties generating the profits are carried out and where value is created,” and
clarifying the position to eliminate both double taxation and non-taxation
or reduced taxation through tax evasion or avoidance.38
Multilateral problems demand multilateral solutions. Implementation
of the BEPS Package will demand updates to model tax conventions, in-
cluding the OECD Model Tax Convention and the UN Model Tax Con-
vention, as well as the bilateral tax treaties that follow those model
conventions.39 Uncoordinated bilateral updates to the treaty network
would be burdensome and time-consuming and would frustrate the imple-
mentation of BEPS measures by creating new BEPS opportunities.
To avoid uncoordinated and inconsistent unilateralism or bilateralism,
pursuant to Action 15 Report, “Developing a Multilateral Instrument to
Modify Bilateral Tax Treaties,” the MLI is intended to effectively and effi-
ciently modify existing agreements in a multilateral context by creating
and maintaining an effective, transparent, and reliable mechanism assisted
by the Depositary, the Secretary General of OECD.40 The MLI is not an
amending protocol to a single existing treaty, and would not directly
change the text of existing treaties.41 Instead, the MLI will be applied
alongside existing tax treaties, serving as the compass to empower and en-
able the modification, interpretation, and application of the Covered Tax
Agreements for the purpose of effective implementation of the treaty-re-
lated BEPS measures and the single tax principle.
The MLI would strengthen global partnerships and facilitate the
smooth modification of the Covered Tax Agreements.42 All Parties would
benefit from active participation either by developing consolidated ver-
sions of their Covered Tax Agreements as modified by the MLI, or by
agreeing subsequently to different but functionally equivalent modifica-
36. See OECD, Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment Status,
Action 7 - 2015 Final Report (Oct. 5, 2015) http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264241220-en.
37. See OECD, Making Dispute Resolution Mechanisms More Effective, Action 14 -
2015 Final Report (Oct. 5, 2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264241633-en.
38. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, preamble.
39. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 4.
40. See OECD, Developing a Multilateral Instrument to Modify Bilateral Tax Treaties,
Action 15 -2015 Final Report, at 18, ¶ 11 (Oct. 5, 2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/97892642
41688-en.
41. See OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24 ¶ 15.
42. Countries adopt multilateral convention to close tax treaty loopholes and improve
functioning of international tax system, OECD (Nov. 24, 2016), http://www.oecd.org/tax/coun-
tries-adopt-multilateral-convention-to-close-tax-treaty-loopholes-and-improve-functioning-
of-international-tax-system.htm.
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tions to their Covered Tax Agreements.43 It is not wise for any Party to be
marginalized and isolated by the far-reaching reform of international tax
regime led by the MLI and the BEPS project as a whole.
The MLI would ensure the coherent and consistent interpretation of
the numerous Covered Tax Agreements. Article 31 of the Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties requires that a treaty “be interpreted in good
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty in
context and in light of its object and purpose.”44 Thus, the purpose of the
MLI and the Covered Tax Agreement should be taken into account for
the purpose of precisely understanding “the context” in question. To clar-
ify the intent of the Parties to ensure that Covered Tax Agreements be
interpreted in line with the mission of the MLI especially in controversial
circumstances, article 6(1) requires the Covered Tax Agreements to be
modified to include the penultimate paragraph of the preamble text of the
MLI.45
In addition to benefiting governments by closing the BEPS loopholes,
the MLI is also intended to benefit MNEs by improving the transparency
and predictability of the international tax regime and effectively minimiz-
ing and/or resolving disputes over the application of Covered Tax
Agreements.46
2.2 The Principled Flexibilities in the MLI
The MLI is both principled and flexible in response to the idealism
and pragmatism of the BEPS package. The treaty-related minimum stan-
dards, including the prevention of treaty abuse under Action 6 and the
improvement of dispute resolution under Action 14, must be implemented
by and through the operation of the MLI in relation to the Covered Tax
Agreements.47 However, the MLI is principled not only because of its
dedication to effective implementation of the minimum standards of
BEPS measures, but also because of firm adherence to the single tax prin-
ciple and multilateralism.48
To some extent, it is difficult or even impossible to develop a “one-
size-fits-all” BEPS solution.49 Recognizing that not all the agreed BEPS
43. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 13.
44. Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331.
45. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 6.
46. Angel Gurrı́a, Secretary-General, OECD, Remarks at Adoption Ceremony of the
BEPS Treaty (Nov. 24, 2016), (transcript available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/remarks-
at-adoption-ceremony-of-the-beps-treaty.htm).
47. OECD, Background Brief: Inclusive Framework on BEPS, ¶ 5 (Jan. 2017), https://
www.oecd.org/ctp/background-brief-inclusive-framework-for-beps-implementation.pdf.
48. For a brief discussion of the complexities of multilateralism in the context of
BEPS, see CHRISTIANA HJI PANAYI, ADVANCED ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN
TAX LAW 153–57 (2015).
49. MICHAEL LANG ET AL., BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING (BEPS): THE PRO-
POSALS TO REVISE THE OECD MODEL CONVENTION 212 (2016).
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measures are minimum standards or hard rules, and given that even the
minimum standards can  be achieved in multiple different ways, the MLI
has to be flexible and moderate to enable the Parties to substantially and
creatively meet the minimum standards and seek best practices pursuant
to the purpose and object of the BEPS project. The Parties enjoy a variety
of solutions to implement the MLI by and through free choice to opt in
and/or opt out, win-win mutual agreements based on compromise, and in-
vention of more effective methodology and tools in line with the mission
and purpose of the MLI and the BEPS package.50
First, the MLI only applies to the Covered Tax Agreements that are
specifically listed by the Contracting Jurisdictions to those Agreements,51
although the MLI is intended to cover all existing tax treaties.52 A Party
may choose to exclude a specific agreement from the scope of Covered
Tax Agreements if such agreement “has been recently renegotiated to im-
plement the outcomes of the BEPS Project, or is currently under renegoti-
ation with the intent of implementing those outcomes in the renegotiated
agreement.”53
Second, the Parties may use a reservation to opt out of the entirety or
parts of substantial provisions not reflecting the minimum standard in the
MLI.54 The reserved provision will not apply as between the reserving
Party and all other Parties to the MLI, and the reserving Party is not obli-
gated to modify the Covered Tax Agreements as foreseen by the reserved
provision of the MLI.55
Third, the Parties may use a reservation to opt out of the entirety or
parts of provisions to be applied to “a subset of Covered Tax Agreements
in order to preserve existing provisions that have specific, objectively de-
fined characteristics.56 “[S]uch reservations will apply as between the re-
serving Party and all Contracting Jurisdictions to the Covered Tax
Agreements covered by such reservations.”57
Fourth, multiple alternatives or optional provisions addressing a par-
ticular BEPS issue offered in the MLI will apply only if all Contracting
Jurisdictions to a Covered Tax Agreement affirmatively and expressly
choose to apply them.58 Parties may also feel free to supplement the main
provision of the MLI with an additional provision in the Covered Tax
Agreement.59
50. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 13–14.
51. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 1–2.
52. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 26.





58. E.g., OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 2424, art. 7(7); OECD MLI Explanatory State-
ment, supra note 24, ¶ 14.
59. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 14.
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Fifth, the MLI provides great flexibility on the provisions relating to a
BEPS minimum standard. Where a minimum standard could be satisfied
in multiple alternative ways, the Contracting Jurisdictions may adopt their
own favorite approaches or solutions.60 In case of conflicts or disputes
arising from different approaches between contracting jurisdictions, the
conflicts are expected to be settled amicably by a mutually satisfactory
solution consistent with the minimum standard.61 If a Party’s Covered Tax
Agreements have already satisfied a specific minimum standard, this Party
may opt out of the provision reflecting this minimum standard.62 To en-
courage best efforts and the honest implementation of minimum stan-
dards, the effectiveness and adequacy of certain Covered Tax Agreement
in satisfying the minimum standard would be tested by the Inclusive
Framework on BEPS.63
Sixth, although Part VI provides for mandatory and binding arbitra-
tion,64 Parties enjoy great autonomy and flexibility on the choice of arbi-
tration rules. Part VI applies only between Parties that expressly choose to
apply it with respect to their Covered Tax Agreements.65 The Parties that
choose to apply Part VI may also formulate their own reservations with
respect to the scope of cases eligible for arbitration subject to acceptance
by the other Parties, despite the defined reservations included in Part
VI.66
Seventh, the MLI encourages the Parties to choose recommended op-
tional provisions.67 Although many optional provisions are not required in
order to meet the minimum standards, they are important “soft law” rules.
Thus, it is wise for the Parties to introduce these best practices and policy
recommendations into the Covered Tax Agreements. For instance, article
6 encourages Parties to include the following optional preamble language
in their Covered Tax Agreements, “[d]esiring to further develop their eco-
nomic relationship and to enhance their co-operation in tax matters.”68 If
all Parties voluntarily pledge allegiance to the mission of the MLI, the
solidarity of global partnership is expected to be further strengthened by
and through more flexible and practical dialogue, negotiation, exchange




63. OECD and G20 countries promised to work together to design and propose a
more inclusive framework in early 2016 to support and monitor the implementation of the
BEPS package. See OECD, Explanatory Statement, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit
Shifting Project, ¶ 11 (2015), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-explanatory-statement-2015.pdf.
64. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 19.
65. Id., art. 18.
66. Id., art. 28.
67. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, preamble.
68. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 6(3).
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2.3 The Macro Structure of the MLI
The MLI of 39 articles could be perceived as a dragon, with the pre-
amble as its eyes, Part I as its head, Parts II through VI as its body, and
Part VII as its tail. The core value of a single tax principle and almost all
treaty-related BEPS measures agreed to in the BEPS Package have been
fully reflected in the MLI.69
Part I is intended to clarify the scope of the MLI and interpretation of
terms.70 Under Article 1, the MLI modifies all Covered Tax Agreements
as defined in article 2 (1)(a).71 Article 2 interprets four terms and provides
the general rules of interpretation of other undefined terms used in the
MLI.72
Part II addresses the measures on hybrid mismatches covered by the
Action 2 Report.73 Article 3 addresses treaty provision on transparent en-
tities.74 In addition to addressing dual-resident entities, article 4 addresses
the tie-breaker rule for determining the treaty residence of dual-resident
persons other than individuals covered by the Action 6 Report.75 Article 5
addresses the exemption method and the credit method.76
Part III addresses treaty abuse covered by the Action 6 Report.77 The
Preamble and article 6 of the MLI clarify that tax treaties are not intended
to be used to generate double non-taxation.78 Article 7(1) and (4) address
the rules aimed at arrangements, one of the principal purposes of which is
to obtain treaty benefits.79 Article 7(8) through (13) focus on the LOB
rule.80 Article 8 focuses on dividend transfer transactions.81 Article 9 fo-
cuses on transactions that circumvent the application of article 13(4).82 Ar-
ticle 10 focuses on the anti-abuse rule for PEs situated in third States.83
Article 11 focuses on application of tax treaties to restrict a Contracting
State’s right to tax its own residents.84
Part IV is intended to amend existing tax treaties to counter the artifi-
cial avoidance of PE status covered by the Action 7 Report.85 Articles 12
69. See id., Annex.
70. Id. arts. 1 – 2.
71. Id., art. 1.
72. Id., art. 2.
73. Id., arts. 3 – 5; OECD supra note 34.
74. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 3.
75. Id. art. 4.
76. Id. art. 5.
77. Id., arts 6 – 11; OECD, supra note 27.
78. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, preamble, art. 6.
79. Id., arts. 7(1), 7(4).
80. Id., arts. 7(8) – 7(13).
81. Id., art. 8.
82. Id. art 9.
83. Id., art. 10.
84. Id., art. 11.
85. Id., arts. 12-16; OECD, supra note 36.
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addresses commissionnaire arrangements and similar strategies.86 Article
13 addresses specific activity exemptions.87 Article 14 addresses splitting-
up of contracts.88 Article 15 defines the term “a person closely related to
an enterprise” frequently used in Part IV.89
Part V and Part VI reflect the Action 14 Report on making dispute
resolution mechanisms more effective.90 Part V focuses on improving dis-
pute resolution (article 16 and article 17) by clarifying the elements of a
minimum standard to ensure the timely, effective and efficient resolution
of treaty-related disputes and best practices.91
Part VI (article 18 through article 26) represents a set of cohesive pro-
visions on mandatory binding arbitration of mutual agreement procedure
(MAP) cases, in which the competent authorities are unable to reach
timely agreement.92 It contains both substantive content and modalities of
its technical application to Covered Tax Agreements. Rules for compati-
bility with existing provisions are consolidated in article 26, rather than
being scattered in each article.93
Part VII addresses the procedural issues from article 27 through arti-
cle 39, including signature and ratification, acceptance or approval, reser-
vations, notifications, subsequent modifications of covered tax
agreements, conference of the parties, interpretation and implementation,
amendment, entry into force, entry into effect, entry into effect of part VI,
withdrawal, relation with protocols, and depositary.94
To clarify the approach taken in the MLI, the types of provisions of
Covered Tax Agreements intended to be covered and the detailed ways
for the MLI to affect Covered Tax Agreements, an “explanatory state-
ment” was adopted on November 24, 2016.95 It reflects the consensus of
the negotiators with respect to the MLI. It is intended to clarify the opera-
tion of the MLI to modify Covered Tax Agreements, but not to interpret
the underlying BEPS measures, except with respect to Part VI.96
86. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 12.
87. Id., art. 13.
88. Id., art. 14.
89. Id., art. 15.
90. See OECD, supra note 37, nd art. 14.
91. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, arts. 16 – 17.
92. Id. arts. 18 – 26.
93. Id. art. 26.
94. Id. arts. 27 – 39.
95. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 12.
96. Id.
Spring 2018] A Global Treaty Override? 167
2.4 The Micro Structure of Each Substantive Provision of
Part II, III, IV & V
Almost every substantive provision in Part II, III, IV and V (i.e., all
except Part VI) contains a BEPS measure clause, a compatibility clause, a
reservation clause and a notification clause.97
2.4.1 BEPS Measures Clause
As BEPS measures are the backbone of the MLI, it is necessary for
articles 3 through 17 to duplicate the language of the provisions of the
OECD Model Tax Convention developed during the course of the BEPS
Project, with minor technical modifications.98 For instance, “Covered Tax
Agreement” and “Contracting Jurisdiction” replaced “Convention” and
“Contracting State” used in the OECD Model Tax Convention and the
UN Model Tax Convention, respectively.99 References to specific articles
and paragraphs in provisions of existing tax agreements are also replaced
with descriptions of those provisions for the purpose of precisely identify-
ing specific provisions in Covered Tax Agreements.100
2.4.2 Compatibility Clauses
The provisions of the MLI may overlap or conflict with provisions of
Covered Tax Agreements on the same tax matters.101 To clarify the rela-
tionship between the provisions of the MLI and Covered Tax Agreements,
there are four major types of compatibility clauses, whose uses depend on
policy considerations and factual circumstances.102 First, a specified MLI
provision applies only “in place of” an existing provision, and does not
apply where such existing provision does not exist.103 Second, a specified
MLI provision “applies to” or “modifies” an existing provision by chang-
ing the application of the existing provision without replacing it.104 Third,
a specified MLI provision applies “in the absence of” an existing provi-
sion.105 Fourth, a specified MLI provision applies “in place of or in the
absence of” an existing provision, regardless of whether such existing pro-
vision exists and/or whether such existing provision has been notified to
the Depositary.106 If an incompatible or conflicting provision exists, the
provision of the MLI shall prevail.107 In the absence of such existing provi-
97. Id., ¶ 15. See, e.g., OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 3 (providing four
paragraphs that respectively represent each kind of clause).





103. See, e.g., OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 5(7).
104. See, e.g., id., art. 7(5).
105. See, e.g., id., art. 16(4)(b)(i).
106. See, e.g., id., art. 3(4).
107. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 15.
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sion, the provision of the MLI shall be deemed to be automatically added
to the Covered Tax Agreement.108
2.4.3 Reservation Clauses
Reasonable reservations are necessary to respect the Parties’ auton-
omy and to keep the elasticity of the MLI, while unregulated reservations
would make chaos.109 To ensure its harmonious application, the MLI con-
tains reservation clauses to define and regulate the reservations.110 Parties
may opt out of applying certain provisions to their Covered Tax Agree-
ments within a closed list of permitted reservations specified in the reser-
vation clauses.111 To ensure transparency, a reserving Party is required to
provide a list of the existing provisions within the scope of that reserva-
tion.112 The reservation will apply as between the reserving Party and all
other Parties to the MLI.113
2.4.4 Notification Clauses
To safeguard clarity, transparency, certainty, and predictability of its
application, the MLI requires Parties to notify the Depositary of their
choices and/or significant information regarding the Covered Tax Agree-
ments.114 First, Parties should report their choices of optional provisions
to the Depositary, “and describe the consequences of a mismatch between
the Contracting Jurisdictions to a Covered Tax Agreement.”115 Second,
Parties should notify the Depositary of specific types of existing provisions
within the scope of compatibility clauses that are superseded or modified
by the MLI.116 Parties are expected to identify, notify, and disclose all
provisions within the objective scope of the compatibility clause.117 In case
of inadvertent omission of existing provisions, additional notifications are
expected to be forthcoming.118 If the contracting jurisdictions disagree on
whether existing provisions are within the scope of a compatibility clause,
such disputes should be settled either through the mutual agreement pro-
cedure, or a Conference of the Parties.119
108. Id.
109. Id., ¶ 14.
110. Id.
111. See OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 28.
112. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 271.
113. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 28(3).
114. Id., art. 29.
115. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 15; See e.g. OECD 2017
MLI, supra note 24, art. 5(10).
116. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 15; See e.g. OECD 2017
MLI, supra note 24, art. 8(4).
117. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 15.
118. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 29(6); OECD MLI Explanatory Statement,
supra note 24, ¶ 18.
119. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 18.
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2.5 Interpretation of Terms
2.5.1 Covered Tax Agreement
Article 2(1)(a) of the MLI defines the term “Covered Tax Agree-
ment” as “an agreement for the avoidance of double taxation with respect
to taxes on income . . .  in force between two or more Parties[ ] and/or ju-
risdictions or territories . . . for whose international relations a Party is
responsible, and with respect to which each such Party has made a notifi-
cation to the Depositary listing the agreement as well as any amending or
accompanying instruments thereto . . . as an agreement which it wishes to
be covered by this Convention.”120
While agreements simultaneously covering capital taxes, taxes on cap-
ital gains, and income taxes are also Covered Tax Agreements, agreements
applying solely to shipping and air transport or social security are not cov-
ered by the MLI.121
Under article 2 (1)(a)(i) of the MLI, Covered Tax Agreements are
supposed to be in force between two or more Parties and/or jurisdictions
or territories.122 If an agreement has been signed but has not yet entered
into force, a Party may include such agreement in the list of Covered Tax
Agreements, and must notify the Depositary of the date of entry into force
of that agreement.123 Such an inclusive and enabling approach to interpre-
tation would improve the transparency of the potential Covered Tax
Agreements.
2.5.2 Party
Article 2(1)(b) defines the term “Party” used throughout the MLI as a
State for which the MLI is in force, or a jurisdiction which has signed the
MLI and for which the MLI is in force.124 Therefore, Parties can be either
States or Non-State jurisdictions.125
2.5.3 Contracting Jurisdiction
The term “Contracting Jurisdiction” refers to a party to a Covered Tax
Agreement, including States, jurisdictions, or territories.126 Thus, “Con-
tracting Jurisdiction” is broader than “Contracting State.” While “Con-
tracting Party” exclusively refers to a Party to the MLI, “Contracting
Jurisdiction” exclusively refers to a Party to the Covered Tax
Agreements.127
120. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 2(1)(a).
121. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 25.
122. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 2(1)(a).
123. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 32.
124. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 2(1)(b).
125. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 35.
126. Id.
127. Id., ¶¶ 34-35.
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The MLI may cover tax agreements entered into by a State Party on
behalf of a non-State jurisdiction or territory for whose international rela-
tions it is responsible.128 In such cases, the State Party should include
those tax agreements in its list of tax agreements, and the list of reserva-
tions and notifications regarding that jurisdiction or territory may differ
from the State Party’s own list.129
2.5.4 Signatory
The term “Signatory” exclusively used in Part VII, refers to a State or
jurisdiction that has signed the MLI but for which the MLI is not yet in
force.130
2.5.5 Interpretation of Other Undefined Terms
Article 2(2) provides a general rule of interpretation for undefined
terms used in the MLI.131 Unless the context requires otherwise, an unde-
fined term “has the meaning that it has under the relevant Covered Tax
Agreement at the time the Convention is being applied.”132 As noted
above, the purpose of the MLI and of the Covered Tax Agreement should
be taken into account for the purpose of understanding “the context” re-
quired by article 2(2).133
2.6 Hybrid Mismatches
2.6.1 Transparent Entities
Article 3 of the MLI is intended to address the application of tax trea-
ties to the income earned through transparent entities, including partner-
ships and trusts, and to ensure that treaty benefits are granted in
appropriate cases but not granted where neither Contracting State treats
the income of an entity as the income of one of its residents.134
Based on article 1(2) of the OECD Model Tax Convention of 2014
produced by the Action 2 Report, Article 3(1) restates that income de-
rived by or through an entity or arrangement treated as fiscally transpar-
ent under the tax law of either Contracting Jurisdiction, shall be
considered to be income of a resident of a Contracting Jurisdiction, but
only to the extent that the income is treated for purposes of taxation by
that Contracting Jurisdiction as the income of its resident.135
To modify the application of the provisions related to methods for the
elimination of double taxation, article 3(2) clarifies that the Provisions of a
128. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 2(1)(a)(i)(B).
129. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶¶ 27 – 28.
130. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 2(1)(d).
131. Id. art. 2(2).
132. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 37.
133. Id.
134. Id., ¶¶ 39-40.
135. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 3(1).
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Covered Tax Agreement that require Contracting Jurisdiction X to ex-
empt from income tax or provide a deduction or credit equal to the in-
come tax paid with respect to income derived by its resident which may be
taxed in Contracting Jurisdiction Y according to the Covered Tax Agree-
ment, shall not apply to the extent that such provisions allow taxation by
Jurisdiction Y solely because the income is also income derived by its
resident.136
Article 3(3) addresses the link between article 3 and the saving clause
in article 11 by adding an additional sentence to the end of paragraph 1:
“In no case shall the provisions of this paragraph be construed to affect a
Contracting Jurisdiction’s right to tax the residents of that Contracting Ju-
risdiction.”137 It shall apply with respect to any Covered Tax Agreement
for which one or more Parties has made reservation described in Article
11(3)(a).138
Under the compatibility clause in article 3(4), article 3(1) will apply
instead of or in the absence of existing provisions of the same type,
whether such provisions are framed either through a general rule, or by
identifying in detail the treatment of specific fact patterns or specific types
of entities or arrangements.139
Given that “a provision on fiscally transparent entities is not required
in order to meet a minimum standard,”140 the reservation clause in article
3(5) permits Parties to opt out of the entirety or part of Article 3.141 Par-
ties may opt out of article 3(1) while retaining existing provisions denying
benefits in the case of transparent entities established in third jurisdictions
and/or identifying in detail the treatment of specific fact patterns and types
of entities or arrangements.142 Parties may opt out of article 3(2).143 Par-
ties may reserve the right for article 3(1) to replace existing detailed provi-
sions, while keeping existing shorter provisions.144
To ensure clarity, article 3(6) provides the notification requirements
for the Parties.145
136. Id., art. 3(2).
137. Id., art. 3(3).
138. Id.
139. Id., art. 3(4).
140. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 46.
141. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 3(5)(a).
142. Id., art. 3(5).
143. Id., art. 3(5)(f).
144. Id., art. 3(5)(g).
145. Id., art. 3(6).
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2.6.2 Dual Resident Entities
Based on article 4(3) of the OECD Model Tax Convention of 2014,146
Article 4(1) of the MLI is designed to modify the rules for determining the
treaty residence of dual-resident entities.147
Under article 4(1):
where by reason of the [existing] provisions . . . a person is a resi-
dent of more than one Contracting Jurisdiction, the competent au-
thorities . . . shall endeavour to determine by mutual agreement
the Contracting Jurisdiction of which such person shall be deemed
to be a resident . . .  having regard to its place of effective manage-
ment, the place where it is incorporated or otherwise constituted,
and any other relevant factors.148
“In the absence of such agreement, the entity shall not be entitled to any
relief or exemption . . . as may be agreed upon by the competent authori-
ties.”149 Since the failure to grant such benefits cannot be viewed as viola-
tion of the Covered Tax Agreement, the cases in which benefits are denied
due to an agreement failure would not be eligible for arbitration under
Part VI.150
Under the compatibility clause in article 4(2), article 4(1) shall apply
in place of or in the absence of all types of tie-breaker rules on the resi-
dence of entities, but it would not replace existing provisions “specifically
addressing the residence of companies participating in dual-listed com-
pany arrangements”151 across several jurisdictions.
Recognizing that provisions addressing dual-resident entities are not
required to meet the minimum standard,152 the reserving clause in article
4(3) permits Parties to opt out of the entirety of article 4 in different
ways.153 For instance, a Party may opt out of applying it to existing agree-
ments that contain provisions with specific, objectively defined character-
istics, by requiring the competent authorities to endeavor to reach tie-
breaker agreement, setting out the treatment of an entity in case of agree-
ment failure or simply denying treaty benefits without such
requirement.154
To ensure clarity, article 4(4) provides the notification requirements
for the Parties.155 In general, each Party should “notify the Depositary of
146. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 49.
147. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 4(1).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 58.
151. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 4(2).
152. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 54.
153. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 4(3).
154. Id., arts. 4(3)(b)-(d).
155. Id. art. 4(4).
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[the existing] provision . . .  not subject to a reservation”.156 Such a provi-
sion would be replaced by article 4(1) where all parties to the Covered Tax
Agreement have notified accordingly.157 “In other cases, [article 4(1)]
would apply to the Covered Tax Agreement, [but would] supersede the
[existing] provisions only to the extent that those provisions are incompati-
ble with article 4(1).”158
2.6.3 Application of Methods for Elimination of Double Taxation
As recommended by the Action 2 Report,159 article 5 offers three op-
tions for Parties to address problems arising from the inclusion of the ex-
emption method in treaties with respect to items of income not taxed in
the jurisdiction of source.160 Article 5(1) permits a Party to choose one or
none of the options.161 Recognizing that asymmetrical application is nor-
mal in provisions on elimination of double taxation, the option chosen by
each Jurisdiction shall apply with respect to its own residents, where Con-
tracting Jurisdictions make different choices.162
Under Option A, existing provisions
[t]hat would otherwise exempt income derived or capital owned
by a resident of Contracting [Jurisdiction X] from tax in its juris-
diction for the purpose of eliminating double taxation shall not
apply where Contracting Jurisdiction Y applies existing provisions
to exempt such income or capital from tax or to limit the rate . . .
In the latter case . . . [Jurisdiction X] shall allow as a deduction
from the tax on the income or capital of that resident an amount
equal to the tax paid in [Jurisdiction Y].163
Under Option B, existing provisions
[t]hat would otherwise exempt income derived by a resident of
Contracting [Jurisdiction X] from tax in its jurisdiction for the pur-
pose of eliminating double taxation, because such income is
treated as a dividend by [Jurisdiction X], shall not apply where
such income gives rise to a deduction for the purpose of determin-
ing the taxable profits of a resident of [Contracting Jurisdiction Y]
under the laws of [Jurisdiction Y]. In such case, [Jurisdiction X]




159. OECD, supra note 34, ¶¶ 442-444.
160. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 5.
161. Id., art. 5(1).
162. Id., art. 5(1).
163. Id.
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dent an amount equal to the income tax paid in [Jurisdiction
Y].164
Under Option C,
[w]here a resident of Contracting [Jurisdiction X] derives income
or owns capital which may be taxed in Contracting [Jurisdiction
Y] in  accordance with the [existing] provisions . . .“ , [Jurisdiction
X] shall allow, as a deduction from the tax on the income [or capi-
tal] of that resident, an amount equal to the income tax [or capital
tax] paid in [Jurisdiction Y]. . . Such deduction shall not exceed
that part of the income tax or capital tax, as computed before the
deduction is given, which is attributable to the income or the capi-
tal which may be taxed in [Jurisdiction Y]. Where in accordance
with any [existing] provision, income derived or capital owned by
a resident of Contracting [Jurisdiction X] is exempt from tax in
[its] jurisdiction, [Jurisdiction X] may nevertheless, in calculating
the amount of tax on the remaining income or capital of such resi-
dent, take into account the exempted income or capital.165
To address the concerns that accepting asymmetrical application un-
conditionally might disrupt the balance of certain bilateral tax treaties
“where the provision on the elimination of double taxation was the subject
of bilateral compromise”,166 article 5(8) allows a Party that chooses none
of the Options to “reserve the right for the entirety of [article 5] not to
apply with respect to . . .  [its Covered Tax Agreements].167 Given that
“some Parties . . . comfortable with the asymmetrical application of Op-
tion A or B . . . may prefer to address more significant changes . . . through
bilateral negotiation”,168 article 5(9) permits a Party not choosing Option
C, to permit the other Contracting Jurisdiction to not apply Option C.169
Under the notification clause in article 5(10), “each Party . . .  [choos-
ing] to apply an Option . . . shall notify the Depositary of its choice of
Option”.170 To ensure clarity, “an Option shall apply with respect to a
provision of a Covered Tax Agreement only . . . [if the choosing Party]
made such a notification . . . .171
164. Id.
165. Id. art. 5(6)(b).
166. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 72.
167. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 5(8).
168. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 73.
169. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 5(9).
170. Id., art 5(10).
171. Id.
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2.7 Treaty Abuse
2.7.1 Purpose of a Covered Tax Agreement
As the minimum standard for protection against the abuse of tax trea-
ties under Action 6 of BEPS project,172 article 6(1) requires a Covered
Tax Agreement to incorporate the following preamble language:
[I]ntending to eliminate double taxation with respect to the taxes
covered by this agreement without creating opportunities for non-
taxation or reduced taxation through tax evasion or avoidance (in-
cluding through treaty-shopping arrangements aimed at obtaining
reliefs provided in this agreement for the indirect benefit of re-
sidents of third jurisdictions).173
The compatibility clause in article 6(2) describes the interaction be-
tween article 6(1) and the preamble language of Covered Tax
Agreements.174
Article 6(3) encourages Parties to include the full preamble language
produced in the Action 6 Report by adding the other part of the preamble
of the OECD Model Tax Convention: “[d]esiring to further develop their
economic relationship and to enhance their co-operation in tax mat-
ters.”175 Since such an inclusion is not required to meet a minimum stan-
dard, article 6(3) shall modify a Covered Tax Agreement only where all
Contracting Jurisdictions choose to apply it.176
Article 6(4) permits a Party to opt out of applying article 6(1) only
with respect to Covered Tax Agreements already satisfying the minimum
standard.177 Parties may preserve preamble language in their Covered Tax
Agreements that “already . . .  [refer to the intent] to eliminate double
taxation without creating opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxa-
tion, whether that language is limited to cases of tax evasion or avoidance
. . . ”.178
2.7.2 Prevention of Treaty Abuse
To address situations of treaty abuse, the Action 6 Report requests
that countries implement (i) a principal purpose test (PPT) only; (ii) a PPT
and either a simplified or detailed LOB provision; or (iii) a detailed LOB
provision, supplemented by a mechanism that would deal with conduit ar-
rangements not already dealt with in tax treaties.179 Based on Article X
172. OECD, supra note 29 ¶ 72.
173. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 6(1).
174. Id., art. 6(2).
175. Id., art. 6(3).
176. Id., art. 6(6).
177. Id., art. 6(4).
178. Id.
179. OECD, supra note 27, ¶ 22.
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(Entitlement to Benefits) of the OECD Model Tax Convention, a result of
the Action 6 Report, article 7 is the lengthiest article in the MLI.
Given that a PPT alone is the only approach that can satisfy the mini-
mum standard, article 7(1) presents the PPT as the default option.180 A
treaty benefit
shall not be granted in respect to an item of income or capital if it
is  reasonable to conclude, having regard to all relevant facts and
circumstances, that obtaining that benefit was one of the principal
purposes of any arrangement or transaction that resulted directly
or indirectly in that benefit, unless it is established that granting
that benefit in these circumstances would be in accordance with
the object and purpose of the relevant provisions of the Covered
Tax Agreement.181
Although the PPT is intended to identify the purpose behind the arrange-
ment or transaction, this test is objective, rather than subjective, in terms
of practical operation.
Under the compatibility clause in article 7(2), article 7(1)
shall apply in place of or in the absence of provisions of a Covered
Tax Agreement that deny all or part of the benefits that would
otherwise be provided where the principal purpose or one of the
principal purposes of any arrangement or transaction, or of any
person concerned with an arrangement or transaction, was to ob-
tain those benefits.182
Although article 7(1) is intended to replace narrower PPT provisions with
a broader provision, it would not restrict the scope or application of vari-
ous types of anti-abuse rules besides a PPT in existing agreements.183
Given that the competent authorities need necessary discretion to
grant benefits to qualified taxpayers in certain circumstances, Article 7(3)
permits non-reserving Parties under Article 7(15)(a) to add Article 7(4) in
Covered Tax Agreements.184 Where a treaty benefit:
[I]s denied to a person under provisions of the Covered Tax
Agreement . . . , the competent authority of Contracting [Jurisdic-
tion X] that would otherwise have granted this benefit shall never-
theless treat that person as being entitled to this benefit, or to
different benefits with respect to a specific item of income or capi-
tal, if such competent authority, upon request from that person
and after consideration of the relevant facts and circumstances,
determines that the benefits would have been granted to that per-
180. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 90.
181. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 7(1).
182. Id., art. 7(2).
183. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 95.
184. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24,, art. 7(3).
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son in the absence of the transaction or arrangement. The compe-
tent authority. . . requested by a resident of Contracting
[Jurisdiction Y] shall consult with the competent authority of [Ju-
risdiction Y] before rejecting the request.185
Article 7(4) is an optional provision, and shall apply to a Covered Tax
Agreement only where all Contracting Jurisdictions have chosen to apply
it.186
The compatibility clause in article 7(5) clarifies that article 7(4) shall
apply to a PPT of a Covered Tax Agreement.187 As a result, article 7(1)
and article 7(4) may apply together in practice.188
Article 7(6) permits Parties to supplement the PPT by choosing to
apply a simplified LOB provision, which is optional, and applies with re-
spect to a Covered Tax Agreement only “where all Contracting Jurisdic-
tions have chosen to apply it”.189 Where Parties disagree on its
application, the PPT alone applies symmetrically by default.190 However,
it is problematic where one Party chooses the simplified LOB provision
and opts out of article 7 entirely, while another contracting Party chooses
not to apply the simplified LOB provision. To avoid such deadlock in the
bilateral relationship, the simplified LOB provision shall apply when some
but not all Contracting Jurisdictions have chosen to apply it, provided that
there is agreement under article 7(7)(a) or (b).191 There are two possible
outcomes. First, “all Contracting Jurisdictions choosing to apply the PPT
alone may agree that the simplified LOB Provision applies symmetri-
cally.192 Second, all Contracting Jurisdictions choosing to apply the PPT
alone may affirmatively permit asymmetrical application of the simplified
LOB Provision.193 Consequently, the Contracting Jurisdictions choosing
to apply the simplified LOB Provision would apply both the PPT and the
simplified LOB Provision, while the other Contracting Jurisdictions would
apply the PPT alone.194
Articles 7(8) through 7(13) contain a simplified LOB provision.195
“Except as otherwise provided in the Simplified LOB Provision, a resident
of a Contracting Jurisdiction shall not be entitled to a benefit that would
otherwise be accorded by the Covered Tax Agreement”, unless such resi-
185. Id.
186. Id., art. 17(b); OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 98.
187. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24,, art. 7(5).
188. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note24, ¶ 99.
189. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 7(6).
190. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 101.
191. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 7(7).
192. Id., art. 7(7)(a).
193. Id., art. 7(7)(b).
194. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 102.
195. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, arts., 7(8) – (13).
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dent is a “qualified person” at the time that the benefit would be
accorded.196
Article 7(9) lists five categories of “qualified persons” as follows:
a) an individual; b) a Contracting Jurisdiction, or a political subdi-
vision or local authority thereof, or an agency or instrumentality
of any such Contracting Jurisdiction, political subdivision or local
authority; c) a company or other entity, if the principal class of its
shares is regularly traded on one or more recognized stock ex-
changes; d) a person, other than an individual, that  i) is a non-
profit organization of a type agreed to by the Contracting Jurisdic-
tions through an exchange of diplomatic notes or ii) is an entity or
arrangement established in that Contracting Jurisdiction, treated
as a separate person under its domestic taxation laws, and is: A)
established and operated exclusively or almost exclusively to ad-
minister or provide retirement benefits and ancillary or incidental
benefits to individuals and regulated as such by that Contracting
Jurisdiction or one of its political subdivisions or local authorities;
or B) established and operated exclusively or almost exclusively
to invest funds for the benefit of entities or arrangements referred
to in Subdivision A); e) a person other than an individual, if, on at
least half the days of a twelve-month period that includes the time
when the benefit would otherwise be accorded, persons who are
residents of that Contracting Jurisdiction and that are entitled to
benefits of the Covered Tax Agreement under subparagraphs a)
to d) own, directly or indirectly, at least fifty percent of the shares
of the person.197
Under article 7(10),
[A] resident of Contracting Jurisdiction X will be entitled to bene-
fits with respect to an item of income derived from Contracting
Jurisdiction Y, regardless of whether the resident is a qualified
person, if the resident is engaged in the active conduct of a busi-
ness in [Jurisdiction X] and the income derived from [Jurisdiction
Y] emanates from, or is incidental to, that business.198
[I]f a resident of [Jurisdiction X] derives income from business ac-
tivity conducted by that resident in [Jurisdiction Y], or arising in
[Jurisdiction Y] from a connected person, the [qualification] con-
ditions . . . for the benefits shall be considered to be satisfied with
respect to such income only if the business activity carried on by
the resident in [Jurisdiction X] to which the income is related is
substantial in relation to the same activity or a complementary
196. Id., art. 7(8).
197. Id., art. 7(9).
198. Id., art. 7(10).
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business activity carried on by the resident or such connected per-
son in [Jurisdiction Y].199
Under article 7(11),
A resident of a Contracting Jurisdiction to a Covered Tax Agree-
ment that is not a qualified person shall also be entitled to a bene-
fit that would otherwise be accorded by the Covered Tax
Agreement with respect to an item of income if, on at least half of
the days of any twelve-month period that includes the time when
the benefit would otherwise be accorded, persons that are
equivalent beneficiaries own, directly or indirectly, at least sev-
enty-five percent of the beneficial interests of the resident.200
Under article 7(12),
[I]f a resident of [Contracting Jurisdiction X] . . . is neither a quali-
fied person . . . nor entitled to benefits under [article 7(10) or
(11)], the competent authority of [Contracting Jurisdiction Y] may
nevertheless grant the benefits . . . or benefits with respect to a
specific item of income, taking into account the object and pur-
pose of the Covered Tax Agreement, but only if [the] resident
demonstrates to the satisfaction of [the] competent authority that
neither its establishment, acquisition, maintenance, nor the con-
duct of its operations, had [the acquisition of treaty benefits] as
one of its principal purposes. . .. Before either granting or denying
a request made . . .  by a resident of [Jurisdiction X], the compe-
tent authority of [Jurisdiction Y] . . . shall consult with its counter-
part in [Jurisdiction X].201
Article 7(13) defines five terms for the purposes of the Simplified
LOB Provision, including “recognized stock exchange,” “principal class of
shares,” “equivalent beneficiary,” “shares” and “connected persons.”202
Unlike the Simplified LOB Provision, article 7 does not include a de-
tailed LOB provision, which necessitates substantial bilateral customiza-
tion.203 Parties preferring a detailed LOB provision may either opt out of
the PPT and agree to endeavor to reach a bilateral agreement that satisfies
the minimum standard204 or accept the PPT in article 7(1) as an interim
measure and express such intent in their notification to the Depositary.205
The compatibility clause in article 7(14) clarifies that the simplified
LOB Provision is intended to apply in place of or in the absence of ex-
199. Id. art. 7(10)(b).
200. Id., art. 7(11).
201. Id., art. 7(10).
202. Id., art. 7(13).
203. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 90.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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isting LOB provisions, but not to restrict the scope or application of other
types of anti-abuse rules in Covered Tax Agreements.206
Under the reservation clause in article 7(15), Parties intending to sat-
isfy the minimum standard by adopting a combination of a detailed LOB
provision and either rules to address conduit financing structures or a PPT,
may opt out of article 7(1) but should “endeavor to reach a mutually satis-
factory solution [satisfying the minimum standard”.207 Parties may opt out
of either articles 7(1) and 7(4) with respect to Covered Tax Agreements
already containing a PPT, or the simplified LOB Provision with respect to
their Covered Tax Agreements already containing a LOB provision de-
scribed in article 7(14).208
Under article 7(16), “except where the Simplified LOB Provision ap-
plies [under Article 7(7)], a Party [choosing under article 7(6)] to apply the
Simplified LOB Provision may reserve the right to have the entirety of
[article 7] not apply with respect to its Covered Tax Agreements . . . [and]
the Contracting Jurisdictions shall endeavor to reach a mutually satisfac-
tory solution [meeting] the minimum standard.”209
Article 7(17) describes very detailed notification requirements to en-
sure clarity as to the application of article 7.210
2.7.3 Dividend Transfer Transactions
Based on article 10(2) of the OECD Model Tax Convention revised by
the Action 6 Report,211 article 8(1) introduced a minimum shareholding
period for a company to be entitled to exemption or a reduced rate on
dividends from a subsidiary.212
Provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement [exempting from tax] div-
idends paid by a company which is a resident” of Contracting Ju-
risdiction X or limiting the tax rate on dividends “provided that
the beneficial owner or the recipient . . . is a resident of [Con-
tracting Jurisdiction Y] and . . . owns, holds, or controls more than
a certain amount of the capital, shares, stock, voting power, voting
rights, or similar ownership interests of the company paying the
dividends, shall apply only if the ownership conditions described
in those provisions are met throughout a 365-day period that in-
cludes the day of the payment of the dividends.”213
206. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 7(14).
207. Id., art. 7(15)(a).
208. Id., art. 7(15)(b) and (c).
209. Id., art. 7(16).
210. Id., art. 7(17).
211. See OECD, supra note 27, ¶ 36.
212. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 8(1).
213. Id.
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However, article 8(1) is not intended to modify conditions or elements of
Covered Tax Agreement, including tax rates, ownership thresholds and
forms of ownership.214
The compatibility clause in article 8(2) clarifies that the 365-day mini-
mum shareholding period “shall apply in place of or in the absence of a
minimum holding period in [existing] provisions” . . . .215
Given that a provision addressing dividend transfer transactions is not
required in order to meet a minimum standard, the reservation clause in
Article 8(3) allows Parties to opt out of Article 8 entirely, either uncondi-
tionally or conditionally to the extent that the existing provisions already
include a minimum holding period, regardless of whether it is shorter or
longer than a 365-day period.216
To ensure clarity, the notification clause in Article 8(4) sets out notifi-
cation requirements and clarifies that Article 8(1) “shall apply with respect
to an [existing] provision only where all Contracting Jurisdictions have
made such a notification with respect to the that provision”.217
2.7.4 Capital Gains from Alienation of Shares or Interests of Entities
Deriving Their Value Principally from Immovable Property
Based on Article 13(4) of the OECD Model Tax Convention as re-
vised by the Action 6 Report and Article 13(4) of the UN Model Tax Con-
vention,218 Article 9(1) addresses situations in which assets are
contributed to an entity shortly before the sale of shares or comparable
interests in that entity in order to dilute the proportion of the value of the
entity that is derived from immovable property.219
Under Article 9(1):
Provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement providing that gains de-
rived by a resident of a Contracting Jurisdiction from the aliena-
tion of shares or other rights of participation in an entity may be
taxed in the other Contracting Jurisdiction provided that these
shares or rights derived more than a certain part of their value
from immovable property (real property) situated in that other
Contracting Jurisdiction (or provided that more than a certain
part of the property of the entity consists of such immovable prop-
erty (real property)): a) shall apply if the relevant value threshold
is met at any time during the 365 days preceding the alienation;
and b) shall apply to shares or comparable interests, such as inter-
ests in a partnership or trust (to the extent that such shares or
214. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 122.
215. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 8(2).
216. Id. art. 8(3).
217. Id. art. 8(4).
218. See OECD, supra note 27, ¶ 44.
219. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 9(1).
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interests are not already covered) in addition to any shares or
rights already covered by the provisions.”220
Given that article 9(1) is intended to “introduce a testing period and to
[expand the scope of covered interests], the threshold provided in existing
provisions would be preserved”.221 The exceptional rule on the application
of the existing provisions would continue to apply.222 For example, “some
Covered Tax Agreements may exclude gains derived from the alienation
of shares of listed companies. . .”.223
The compatibility clause in article 9 (2) clarifies that the 365-day test-
ing period “shall apply in place of or in the absence of a time period for
determining whether the relevant value threshold in [existing] provisions
was met”.224
Under article 9(3), parties may apply optional article 9(4), based on
article 13(4) of the OECD Model Tax Convention,225 “to their Covered
Tax Agreements, rather than incorporating a testing period and expanding
interest covered by existing capital gains provisions”.226
[F]or purposes of a Covered Tax Agreement, gains derived by a
resident of Contracting Jurisdiction [X] from the alienation of
shares or comparable interests, such as interests in a partnership
or trust, may be taxed in Contracting [Jurisdiction Y] if, at any
time during the 365 days preceding the alienation, these shares or
comparable interests derived more than fifty percent of their
value directly or indirectly from immovable property (real prop-
erty) situated in [Jurisdiction Y].227
The compatibility clause in article 9(5) clarifies that article 9(4) “shall
apply in place of or in the absence of [existing]provisions of Covered Tax
Agreements . . . [addressing capital gains] from the alienation of shares or
[interests in entities] . . .  [deriving their value principally] from immovable
property”.228
“Given that a provision addressing capital gains from alienation of
shares or interests in entities deriving their value principally from immova-
ble property is not required in order to meet the minimum standard,”229
the reservation clause in article 9(6) allows Parties to opt out of either
220. Id.
221. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 131.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 9(2).
225. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 133.
226. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 9(3).
227. Id. art. 9(4).
228. Id. art. 9(5).
229. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 136.
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article 9(1) entirely, or opt out of article 9(1)(a) and  (b) separately.230”
Parties may also opt out of [article 9(4)] with respect to their Covered Tax
Agreements that already contain a provision described in article [9(5)]
. . .”.231
The reservation clause in article 9(7) clarifies that article 9(1) “shall
apply with respect to a provision of a Covered Tax Agreement only where
all Contracting Jurisdictions have made a notification with respect to that
provision”.232
Under article 9(8), article 9(4) “shall apply to a Covered Tax Agree-
ment only where all Contracting Jurisdictions have [chosen to apply it and
notified the Depositary of its choice]”.233 In such a case, article 9(1) would
not apply.234
2.7.5 Anti-abuse Rule for PEs Situated in Third Jurisdictions
Articles 10(1) through (3) are based on the text of the OECD Model
Tax Convention produced in the Action 6 Report.235 Under Article 10(1),
[W]here an enterprise of Contracting [Jurisdiction X] derives in-
come from Contracting [Jurisdiction Y] and [Jurisdiction X] treats
such income as attributable to a PE of the enterprise situated in a
third [jurisdiction Z], and the profits attributable to that PE are
exempt from tax in [Jurisdiction X], the [treaty] benefits shall not
apply to any item of income on which the tax in [jurisdiction Z] is
less than sixty percent of the tax that would be imposed in [Juris-
diction X] on that item of income if that PE were situated in [Ju-
risdiction X].236 In such a case, any income to which the
provisions of [article 10(1)] apply shall remain taxable according
to the domestic law of [Jurisdiction Y], notwithstanding any other
provisions of the Covered Tax Agreement.237
However, under article 10(2), article 10(1)
[S]hall not apply if the income [of Jurisdiction Y is] derived in
connection with or is incidental to the active conduct of a business
carried on through the PE (other than the business of making,
managing, or simply holding investments for the enterprise’s own
account, unless these activities are banking, insurance, or securi-
230. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 9(6).
231. Id., art. 9(6)(f).
232. Id., art. 9(7).
233. Id., art. 9(8).
234. Id., art. 9(6).
235. OECD, supra note 27, ¶ 52.
236. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 10(1).
237. Id.
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ties activities carried on by a bank, insurance enterprise or regis-
tered securities dealer, respectively).238
Article 10(3) empowers the competent authorities to grant treaty ben-
efits in certain justified circumstances.239 “If benefit[s] . . . are denied pur-
suant to [article 10(1)] with respect to an item of income derived by a
resident of [Jurisdiction X], the competent authority of [Jurisdiction Y]
may, nevertheless, grant these benefits with respect to that item of income,
if . . . [the] authority determines that granting such benefits is justified in
light of the reasons [the] resident did not satisfy the requirements of [arti-
cle 10(1) and (2)]”.240 “The competent authority . . . shall consult with [its
counterpart in Jurisdiction X] before either granting or denying the
request”.241
The compatibility clause in article 10(4) clarifies that articles 10(1)
through (3) shall apply in place of or in the absence of a provision address-
ing PEs situated in third jurisdictions.242
“Given that a provision addressing [PE]s situated in third jurisdictions
is not required in order to meet the minimum standard,”243 the reserva-
tion clause in Article 10(5) permits a Party to opt out of article 10 in three
different ways.244
The notification clause in article 10(6) requires the non-reserving Par-
ties to notify the Depositary.245 “Where all Contracting Jurisdictions have
[notified] with respect to a provision of a Covered Tax Agreement, that
provision shall be replaced by [articles 10(1) through (3)]”.246 Articles
10(1) through (3) shall supersede the existing provisions only to the extent
of incompatibility.247
2.7.6 Application of Tax Agreements to Restrict a Party’s Right to
Tax Its Own Residents
Based on article 1(3) of the OECD Model Tax Convention as set out
in the Action 6 Report,248 the saving clause in article 11(1) is intended to
preserve the right of a Contracting Jurisdiction to tax its own residents.249
Under article 11(1), a Covered Tax Agreement shall not affect the
taxation by a Contracting Jurisdiction of its residents, except with respect
238. Id., art. 10(2).
239. Id., art. 10(3).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id., art. 10(4).
243. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note24, ¶ 145.
244. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24 art. 10(5).
245. Id., art. 10(6).
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. OECD, supra note 27, ¶ 63.
249. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 11(1).
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to the following ten categories of treaty benefits: i) business profits of a PE
or  profits of an associated enterprise; ii) government service; iii) qualified
student, business apprentice or trainee, teacher, professor, lecturer, in-
structor, researcher or research scholar; iv) credit method and exemption
method); v) non-discrimination; vi) mutual agreement procedure; vii)
members of diplomatic missions, government missions, or consular posts;
viii) pensions or other payments made under social security legislation; ix)
pensions and similar payments, annuities, alimony payments, or other
maintenance payments; or x) other provisions that expressly limit taxation
rights of the residence jurisdiction or allow taxation rights exclusively to
the source jurisdiction.250
The compatibility clause in article 11(2) clarifies that article 11(1) re-
places existing provisions “stating that the Covered Tax Agreements
would not affect the taxation by a Contracting Jurisdiction of its re-
sidents,” or is added where such provisions do not exist.251
“Given that a saving clause is not required  to meet the minimum stan-
dard,”252 and recognizing that some Parties may prefer a more targeted
solution,253 article 11(3)(a) allows Parties to opt out of article 11 en-
tirely.254 In such a case, article 3(3) applies to introduce a saving clause
that relates solely to the provision in article 3(1).255 Recognizing that an
existing saving clause provision is usually customized based on the content
of such Agreements, article 11(3)(b) allows the Parties to opt out of article
11 entirely with respect to Covered Tax Agreements already containing a
saving clause.256
The notification clause in article 11(4) clarifies that an existing provi-
sion of a Covered Tax Agreement would be replaced by the provisions of
article 11(1), “where all Contracting Jurisdictions have made such a notifi-
cation with respect to the [existing provision]”.257 In other cases, article
11(1) would supersede the existing provisions only to the extent of
incompatibility.258
2.8 Avoidance of PE Status
2.8.1 Artificial Avoidance of PE Status Through Commissionnaire
Arrangements and Similar Strategies
Article 12(1) of the new MLI, based on article 5(5) of the OECD
Model Tax Convention produced in the Action 7 Report,259 states that:
250. Id.
251. Id., art. 11(2).
252. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 153.
253. Id.
254. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 11(3)(a).
255. Id., art. 3(3).
256. Id., art. 11(3)(b).
257. Id., art. 11(4).
258. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 155 .
259. OECD, supra note 36, at 16.
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[W]here a person is acting in a Contracting Jurisdiction . . . on
behalf of an enterprise and, in doing so, habitually concludes con-
tracts, or habitually plays the principal role leading to the conclu-
sion of contracts that are routinely concluded without material
modification by the enterprise, and these contracts are: a) in the
name of the enterprise; or b) for the transfer of the ownership of,
or for the granting of the right to use, property owned by that
enterprise or that the enterprise has the right to use; or c) for the
provision of services by that enterprise, that enterprise shall be
deemed to have a permanent establishment in that Contracting
Jurisdiction in respect of any activities which that person under-
takes for the enterprise unless these activities, if they were exer-
cised by the enterprise through a fixed place of business of that
enterprise situated in that Contracting Jurisdiction, would not
cause that fixed place of business to be deemed to constitute a
permanent establishment under the definition of permanent es-
tablishment included in the Covered Tax Agreement.260
Based on article 5(6)(a) of the OECD Model Tax Convention produced in
the Action 7 Report,261 article 12(2) clarifies that article 12(1) “shall not
apply where the person acting in Contracting [Jurisdiction X] on behalf of
[an enterprise of Contracting Jurisdiction Y carries on business in Jurisdic-
tion X as] an independent agent and acts for the enterprise in the ordinary
course of that business”.262 “Where, however, a person acts exclusively or
almost exclusively on behalf of one or more enterprises to which it is
closely related, that person shall not be considered to be an independent
agent [  ]with respect to any such enterprise.”263
The compatibility clause in article 12(3) describes the interaction be-
tween article 12(1) and (2) and various existing provisions.264 Article 12(1)
“would [replace existing provisions] describing the conditions under which
an enterprise shall be deemed to [have a] PE in a Contracting Jurisdiction
in respect of an activity which a person other than an [independent] agent
undertakes for the enterprise, but only to the extent that such provisions
address the situation in which [the] person has, and habitually exercises,
[authority] in that Contracting Jurisdiction to conclude contracts in the
name of the enterprise”.265 However, article 12(1) would not apply to a
provision providing that an enterprise can be deemed to have a PE for a
reason other than an authority to conclude contracts that are binding on
another enterprise.266 Article 12(2) would replace existing provisions pro-
viding “that an enterprise shall not be deemed to have a PE in a Con-
260. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 12(1).
261. OECD, supra note 36, at 7.
262. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 12(2).
263. Id., art. 12(2).
264. Id. art. 12(3).
265. Id., art. 12(3)(a).
266. Id.
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tracting Jurisdiction in respect of an activity which an agent of an
independent status undertakes for the enterprise”.267
Given that provisions addressing the issues of article 12 are not re-
quired to meet the minimum standard,268 article 12(4) allows a Party to
opt out of article 12 entirely.269
The notification clauses in article 12(5) and (6) clarify that article
12(1) or (2) would apply with respect to an existing provision only where
all Contracting Jurisdictions to such Agreement have made such a
notification.270
2.8.2 Artificial Avoidance of PE Status Through the
Specific Activity Exemptions
Article 13 is intended to reflect the changes brought by the Action 7
Report to the wording of article 5(4) of the OECD Model Tax Convention
of 2014, so as to address situations in which the specific activity exemp-
tions give rise to BEPS concerns.271 Article 13(1) permits a Party to
choose to apply Option A or Option B or to apply neither Option.272
To address concerns of artificial avoidance of PE status through the
specific activity exemptions, Option A explicitly states:
[T]hat the activities listed therein will be deemed not to constitute
a PE only if they are of a preparatory or auxiliary character, in-
cluding: a) the activities specifically listed in [existing provisions]
as activities deemed not to constitute a PE, whether or not that
exception from PE status is contingent on the activity being of a
preparatory or auxiliary character; b) the maintenance of a fixed
place of business solely for the purpose of carrying on, for the
enterprise, any activity not described in subparagraph a); c) the
maintenance of a fixed place of business solely for any combina-
tion of activities mentioned in subparagraphs a) and b).273
Option B is designed as an alternative provision to address inappro-
priate use of the specific activity exemptions through anti-fragmentation
rules.274 The term “PE” shall be deemed not to include:
a) the activities specifically listed in the [existing provisions] as
activities deemed not to constitute a PE, whether or not that ex-
ception from PE status is contingent on the activity being of a
preparatory or auxiliary character, except to the extent that the
267. Id., art. 12(3)(b).
268. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 165.
269. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 12(4).
270. Id., art. 12(5) – (6).
271. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 168.
272. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 13(1).
273. Id., art. 13(2).
274. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 169.
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relevant [existing] provisions provides explicitly that a specific ac-
tivity shall be deemed not to constitute a PE provided that the
activity is of a preparatory or auxiliary character; b) the mainte-
nance of a fixed place of business solely for the purpose of carry-
ing on, for the enterprise, any activity not described in
subparagraph a), provided that this activity is of a preparatory or
auxiliary character; c) the maintenance of a fixed place of business
solely for any combination of activities mentioned in subpara-
graphs a) and b), provided that the overall activity of the fixed
place of business resulting from this combination is of a prepara-
tory or auxiliary character.275
The application of Option A will permit Parties to preserve the excep-
tions for activities described in existing provisions, but will require that
those activities must be preparatory or auxiliary.276 In contrast, the appli-
cation of Option B will permit Parties to preserve the exceptions for activi-
ties described in existing provisions, but “will require that those exceptions
will apply irrespective of whether the activity is of a preparatory or auxil-
iary character‘.277
To address the fragmentation of activities between closely related par-
ties and avoid the abuse of the exceptional rules on the definition of PE,
article 13(4) clarifies that a provision of a Covered Tax Agreement
[T]hat lists specific activities deemed not to constitute a PE shall
not apply to a fixed place of business that is used or maintained by
an enterprise if the same enterprise or a closely related enterprise
carries on business activities at the same place or at another place
in the same Contracting Jurisdiction and: a) that place or other
place constitutes a PE for the enterprise or the closely related en-
terprise under the provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement defin-
ing a PE; or b) the overall activity resulting from the combination
of the activities carried on by the two enterprises at the same
place, or by the same enterprise or closely related enterprises at
the two places, is not of a preparatory or auxiliary character, pro-
vided that the business activities carried on by the two enterprises
at the same place, or by the same enterprise or closely related
enterprises at the two places, constitute complementary functions
that are part of a cohesive business operation.278
The compatibility clause in article 13(5) (a)clarifies that Option A or
Option B “shall apply in place of the relevant parts of [existing] provisions
[listing] specific activities that are deemed not to constitute a PE even if
275. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 13(3).
276. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 171.
277. Id., ¶ 173.
278. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 13(4).
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the activity is carried on through a fixed place of business”.279 Further,
Article 13(5)(b) “shall apply to existing provisions [listing] specific activi-
ties that are deemed not to constitute a PE even if the activity is carried on
through a fixed place of business”.280 Such existing provisions would in-
clude those modeled after article 5(4) of the OECD Model Tax Conven-
tion of 2014 or article 5(4) of the UN Model Tax Convention of 2011  and
bilaterally negotiated provisions of the same type.281
“Given that provisions addressing artificial avoidance of PE status
through the specific activity exemptions [ ] are not required to meet the
minimum standard”,282 article 13(6) permits a Party to opt out of either
article 13 entirely, or Option A with respect to existing provisions already
explicitly stating “that [listed] activities shall be deemed not to constitute a
PE only if [the activities is] preparatory or auxiliary”, or Article 13(4).283
The notification clause in article 13(7) requires Parties choosing “to
apply an Option [to] notify the Depositary of its choice of Option”.284
“An Option shall apply [  ] to a provision [  ] only where all Contracting
Jurisdictions have chosen to apply the same Option and have made such a
notification . . .”.285
Article 13(8) requires Parties not opting out of applying article 13(4)
(or the entirety of Article 13) to notify the Depositary of each of its Cov-
ered Tax Agreements that includes specific activity exemptions.286 Article
13(4) “shall apply to [an existing] provision only where all Contracting
Jurisdictions have made [such] a notification . . .”287
2.8.3 Splitting-up of Contracts
Article 14 is designed to address abusive splitting-up of contracts as a
potential strategy for the artificial avoidance of PE status, as a response to
the Action 7 Report.288
Under article 14(1), “for the sole purpose of determining whether the
period (or periods) referred to in an [existing] provision that stipulates a
period (or periods) of time after which specific projects or activities shall
constitute a PE has been exceeded”:
a) where an enterprise E of Contracting Jurisdiction X carries
on activities in Contracting Jurisdiction Y at a place that con-
stitutes a building site, construction project, installation pro-
279. Id. art. 13(5).
280. Id., art. 13(5)(a).
281. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 178.
282. Id., ¶ 179.
283. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. (6).
284. Id., art. 13(7).
285. Id.
286. Id., art. 13(8).
287. Id.
288. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 182.
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ject or other specific project identified in the relevant existing
provision, or carries on supervisory or consultancy activities
in connection with such a place, in the case of an existing pro-
vision referring to such activities, and these activities are car-
ried on during one or more periods of time that, in the
aggregate, exceed 30 days without exceeding the period or pe-
riods referred to in the relevant existing provision;
b) where connected activities are carried on in Jurisdiction Y at
(or in connection with) the same building site, construction or
installation project, or other place identified in the relevant
existing provision during different periods of time, each ex-
ceeding 30 days, by one or more enterprises closely related to
enterprise E, these different periods of time shall be added to
the aggregate period of time during which enterprise E has
carried on activities at that building site, construction or in-
stallation project or other place identified in the relevant ex-
isting provision.289
The compatibility clause in article 14(2) clarifies that article 14(1) “shall
apply in place of or in the absence of [existing] provisions to the extent
that such provisions address the division of contracts into multiple parts to
avoid the application of a time period or periods” that determine whether
a PE exists for specific projects or activities.290 Although anti-splitting
rules in many treaties apply to a wide range of activities, article 14(2) is
only intended to replace existing rules to the extent that they relate to the
activities described in article 14(1), and leaves those rules intact with re-
spect to activities not within the scope of article 14(1).291
Given that anti-splitting provisions are not required in order to meet
the minimum standard,292 the reservation clause in article 14(3) permits a
Party to opt out of the entirety of Article 14.293 Recognizing that the anti-
contract-splitting rules addressing the exploration for or exploitation of
natural resources are generally carefully negotiated,294 a Party may opt
out of the entirety of article 14 “with respect to [existing] provisions relat-
ing to the exploration for or exploitation of natural resources”.295
The notification clause in article 14(4) clarifies that article 14(1) shall
replace anti-splitting provisions to the extent provided in article 14(2)
where all Contracting Jurisdictions to the Covered Tax Agreement have
notified accordingly.296 “In other cases, [article 14(1)] shall apply to [the
289. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 14(1).
290. Id., art. 14(2).
291. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 185.
292. Id.
293. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 14(3)(a).
294. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 186.
295. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note24, art. 14(3)(b).
296. Id., art. 14(4).
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Covered Tax Agreement, but will] supersede the existing provisions only
to the extent of incompatibility . . .”297
2.8.4 Definition of a Person Closely Related to an Enterprise
Based on article 5(6)(b) of the OECD Model Tax Convention,298 arti-
cle 15(1) describes the conditions under which a person will be considered
“closely related” to an enterprise for the purposes of articles 12, 13 and
14.299
A person is closely related to an enterprise if, based on all the
relevant facts and circumstances, one has control of the other or
both are under the control of the same persons or enterprises.
[Specifically], a person shall be considered to be closely related to
an enterprise if one possesses directly or indirectly more than fifty
percent of the beneficial interest in the other (or, in the case of a
company, more than fifty percent of the aggregate vote and value
of the company’s shares or of the beneficial equity interest in the
company) or if another person possesses directly or indirectly
more than fifty percent of the beneficial interest (or, in the case of
a company, more than fifty percent of the aggregate vote and
value of the company’s shares or of the beneficial equity interest
in the company) in the person and the enterprise.300
Since article 15(1) is essential to understand the term “closely related
to an enterprise” used in the MLI, Parties can opt out of Article 15 only if
they have made the reservations described in Article 12(4), Article
13(6)(a) or (c), and Article 14(3)(a).301
2.9 Improving Dispute Resolution
Given that the minimum standard for improving dispute resolution
declared in the Action 14 Report can be complemented by a set of best
practices, Part V of the MLI is designed to provide ways to incorporate
some of those best practices into Covered Tax Agreements.302
2.9.1 Mutual Agreement Procedure
To provide for taxpayer’s rights in the context of international tax law,
articles 16(1) through (3) are intended to effectively incorporate articles
25(1) through (3) of the OECD Model Tax Convention into Covered Tax
Agreements and to set out the requirements for the mutual agreement
procedure (MAP).303
297. Id.
298. OECD, supra note 36, at 16 –17.
299. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 15(1).
300. Id.
301. Id., art. 15(2).
302. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 191.
303. Id., ¶ 191.
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Where a person considers that the actions of one or both of the
Contracting Jurisdictions result or will result for that person in
taxation not in accordance with the provisions of the Covered Tax
Agreement, that person may present the case to the competent
authority of either Contracting Jurisdiction within three years of
the first notification of the [aforesaid action] . . . . The competent
authority shall endeavor, . . . to resolve the case by mutual agree-
ment with its counterpart in the other Contracting Jurisdiction,
with a view to the avoidance of taxation which is not in accor-
dance with the Convention. Any agreement reached shall be im-
plemented notwithstanding any time limits in the domestic law of
the Contracting Jurisdictions. The competent authorities shall en-
deavor to resolve by mutual agreement any difficulties or doubts
arising as to the interpretation or application of the Convention
. . . .304
The compatibility clause in Article 16(4) permits Parties to retain ex-
isting provisions relating to dispute resolution to the extent that those pro-
visions are consistent in content with the provisions of article 16(1)
through (3), and subject to any reservations provided in article 16(5).305
The reserving clause in article 16(5) permits Parties to implement ele-
ment 1.1 of the Action 14 minimum standard through administrative mea-
sures, as provided under elements 3.1 and 3.3 of the Action 14 minimum
standard.306
A Party may opt out of applying the first sentence of article 16(1)
[On the basis that it intends to meet the minimum standard [under
the BEPS Package by ensuring] that under each of its Covered
Tax Agreements, . . . the taxpayer may present its case to the com-
petent authority of the Contracting Jurisdiction of which it is a
resident . . . or a national and that [such] competent authority will
implement a bilateral notification or consultation process with [its
counterpart] in the other Contracting Jurisdiction for [the MAP]
cases in which [such] competent authority [does not consider the
taxpayer’s objection to be justified].307
A Party may opt out of applying the three-year period requirement of
article 16(1) on the basis that it intends to meet the minimum standard by
ensuring that, “where its tax treaty does not contain a provision stipulating
the time period for the taxpayer to present the [MAP] case”, the taxpayer
is allowed to present the MAP case within a period of at least three
years.308 “It is anticipated, therefore, that this reservation would only be
304. Id., art. 16(3).
305. Id., art. 16(4).
306. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 199.
307. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 16(5)(a).
308. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 16(5)(b).
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made by a Contracting Jurisdiction if its domestic regulations apply auto-
matically and are more favorable in their effects to the taxpayer, either
because they allow a longer time for presenting objections or because they
do not set any time limits for such purpose.”309
A Party may also reserve on the application of the second sentence of
article 16(2) only on the basis that either (i) all MAP agreements “shall be
implemented notwithstanding any time limits in the domestic law of the
Contracting Jurisdictions”310; or (ii) it intends to meet the minimum stan-
dard by accepting, in its bilateral treaty negotiations, alternative treaty
provisions that limit the time during which a Contracting Jurisdiction may
make an adjustment pursuant to provisions modeled after article 9(1) or
article 7(2) of the OECD Model Tax Convention, in order to avoid late
adjustments with respect to which MAP relief will not be available.311
Article 16(6) requires a number of notifications to ensure clarity as to
how Covered Tax Agreements will be modified by article 16.312
2.9.2 Corresponding Adjustments
Given that the Action 14 Report noted that it would be more efficient
if jurisdictions had the possibility to unilaterally provide for corresponding
adjustments in cases in which they find the objection of the taxpayer to be
justified.313 Recognizing that Best Practice No. 1 contained in the Action
14 Report states that jurisdictions should include article 9(2) of the OECD
Model Tax Convention in their tax treaties,314 article 17 is intended to
provide a mechanism for Parties to implement this Best Practice.315
Article 17(1) requires corresponding adjustments.316 “Where a
Contracting Jurisdiction [X] includes in the profits of an enter-
prise of [its] Jurisdiction —and taxes accordingly— profits on
which an enterprise of [ ] Contracting Jurisdiction [Y] has been
charged to tax  in Jurisdiction [Y], and the profits so included are
profits which would have accrued to the enterprise of Jurisdiction
[X] (if the conditions made between the two enterprises had been
those which would have been made between independent enter-
prises), then [Jurisdiction Y] shall make an appropriate adjust-
ment to the amount of the tax charged therein on those profits. In
determining such adjustment, due regard shall be had to the other
provisions of the Covered Tax Agreement and the competent au-
309. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 201.
310. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 16(4)(b).
311. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 16(5)(c).
312. Id., art. 16(6).
313. OECD, Making Dispute Resolution Mechanisms More Effective, supra note 37, ¶
43.
314. Id.
315. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 209.
316. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 17(1).
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thorities of [Jurisdictions X and Y] shall if necessary consult each
other.”317
The compatibility clause in article 17 (2) provides that article 17(1)
“shall apply in the place of or in the absence of a provision that requires a
Contracting Jurisdiction to make an appropriate adjustment. . . where the
other Contracting Jurisdiction [makes an adjustment that reflects the
arm’s length profits of an enterprise] . . .”.318 Some existing provisions are
modeled after article 9(2) of the OECD Model Tax Convention or the UN
Model Tax Convention. If certain existing provisions only permit, but do
not require, a Contracting Jurisdiction to make a corresponding adjust-
ment, such provisions would be outside the scope of article 17(2) and
would continue to apply except in the case of incompatibility.319 If such
provisions would permit a Contracting Jurisdiction to choose not to make
an appropriate adjustment even when the adjustment made by the other
Contracting Jurisdiction was justified, the provisions would be superseded
by article 17(1).
“Given that the inclusion of article 9(2) of the OECD Model Tax Con-
vention in tax treaties is a best practice . . . , not the minimum standard,
[and recognizing that] element 1.1 of the Action 14 minimum standard
requires that jurisdictions provide access to the MAP in transfer pricing
cases and implement the resulting mutual agreements regardless of
whether the tax treaty contains a provision modeled after article 9(2) of
the OECD Model Tax Convention,”320 the conditional reservation clauses
in Article 17(3) permit a Party to reserve the right for article 17 not to
apply to its Covered Tax Agreements that already contain a provision of
the same type.321 “A Party may also opt out of article 17 “on the basis that
in the absence of a provision referred to in [article 17(2)], it shall make the
appropriate adjustment referred to in [article 17(1)], or its competent au-
thority shall endeavor to resolve the case under the [existing] provisions
[relating to MAP].”322 A reserving Party under article 16(5)(c)(ii) may opt
out of article 17 “on the basis that in its bilateral treaty negotiations it shall
accept a treaty provision of the type contained in [article 17(1)], provided
that the Contracting Jurisdictions were able to reach agreement on that
provision and on the provisions described in [article 16(5)(c)(ii)].323
The notification clause in article 17(4) requires Parties to notify the
Depositary of whether each of its Covered Tax Agreements contains an
existing requirement to make a corresponding adjustment.324 The provi-
sions of article 17(1) will replace such provisions where all Contracting
317. Id.
318. Id., art. 17(2).
319. But c.f. Id.
320. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 212.
321. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 17(3)(a).
322. Id., art. 17(3)(b).
323. Id., art. 17(3)(c).
324. Id., art. 17(4).
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Jurisdictions to a Covered Tax Agreement have made such a notifica-
tion.325 In other cases, article 17(1) will supersede existing provisions only
in the case of incompatibility.326
2.10 Arbitration
2.10.1 Choice to Apply Part VI
Article 18 encourages Parties to choose to apply Part VI of the MLI
with respect to its Covered Tax Agreements.327 However, Part VI is in-
tended to apply only between Parties that explicitly choose to apply it by
notifying the Depositary of such choice.328 “A Party is permitted to for-
mulate reservations with respect to the scope of cases eligible for
arbitration”.329
2.10.2 Mandatory Binding Arbitration
Article 19 (1) contains the core arbitration provision.330 “Where the
competent authorities are unable to reach an agreement on a case pursu-
ant to the MAP under the Covered Tax Agreement . . . within a period of
two years . . .  any unresolved issues arising from the case shall, at the
request of the person presenting the case, be submitted to arbitration in
the manner described in [Part VI].”331 However, prior to the expiration of
the two-year period, the competent authorities may agree to a longer or
shorter time period with respect to a particular case, and should notify the
person presenting the case of such agreement.332 Article 19 (8) permits a
Party to reserve the right to substitute a three-year period for the two-year
period for the purposes of applying article 19 to its Covered Tax
Agreements.333
Article 19 (2) is intended to avoid a complicated and unpredictable
situation and to ensure that one remedy process will take place before the
other, where a taxpayer’s case goes through both the MAP and domestic
court or administrative proceedings.334 The period for arbitration request
shall stop running if a competent authority has suspended the MAP be-
cause a case related to one or more of the same issues is pending before
the court or administrative tribunal.335 The period will start running again
when a final decision has been rendered by the court or administrative
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id., art. 18.
328. Id.
329. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 216.
330. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 19(1).
331. Id.
332. Id., art. 19(1)(b).
333. Id., art. 19(8).
334. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 217.
335. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 19(2).
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tribunal or the case has been suspended or withdrawn.336 The period will
also stop running if a person presenting the case and a competent author-
ity have agreed to suspend the mutual agreement process for any reason,
especially for taxpayer-friendly consideration of unexpected personal
hardships. The period will start running again once that suspension has
been lifted.337
Given that additional information from the taxpayer might be re-
quested by either competent authority to undertake substantive considera-
tion of the case, article 19(3) permits the period for arbitration request to
be extended, “where both competent authorities agree that a person di-
rectly affected by the case has failed to provide in a timely manner any
[requested] additional material information . . .  for an amount of time
equal to the period beginning on the date [of] information request and
ending on the date of ultimate provision of information . . .”.338
Article 19(4)(b) is intended to clarify the validity of the arbitration
decision.339 First, the arbitration decision shall be final,340 and “cannot be
changed either by the competent authorities or by the arbitration panel
unless . . . article 24 appl[ies] to permit agreement on a different resolu-
tion.”341 Second, because the arbitration process is an extension of the
MAP in case of deadlock, and the arbitration decision is per se unable to
automatically resolve all the issues without the subsequent supportive mu-
tual agreement, the arbitration decision shall be implemented through mu-
tual agreement concerning the case.342 “Third,
[T]he arbitration decision shall be binding on both Contracting
Jurisdictions except in [three circumstances]: i) if a person directly
affected by the case does not accept the mutual agreement that
implements the arbitration decision. In such a case, the case shall
not be eligible for any further consideration by the competent au-
thorities) . . . ; ii) if a final decision of the courts of one of the
Contracting Jurisdictions holds that the arbitration decision is in-
valid. In such a case, the request for arbitration [ ] shall be consid-
ered not to have been made, and the arbitration process shall be
considered not to have taken place, . . . and a new request for
arbitration may be made unless the competent authorities agree
that such a new request should not be permitted); and iii) if a
person directly affected by the case pursues litigation on the issues
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id., art. 19(3).
339. Id., art. 19(4)(b).
340. Id., art (19(4)(a).
341. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 220.
342. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 19(4)(a); OECD MLI Explanatory State-
ment, supra note 24, ¶ 220.
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which were resolved in the mutual agreement implementing the
arbitration decision in any court or administrative tribunal.”343
Articles 19(5) through (7) set forth detailed requirements as to the
dates for the competent authority to notify the person presenting the case
and the other competent authority regarding the receipt of the MAP re-
quest and the request for additional information.344
Articles 19(8) through (9) provide detailed rules to establish the start
date of the period before unresolved issues in a case are first eligible to be
submitted to arbitration, depending on whether the competent authorities
have requested additional information.345
To ensure smooth and predictable functioning of the arbitration pro-
cess by and through close collaboration between the competent authorities
based on jointly agreed procedural and operational rules, article 19(10)
requires that the competent authorities “settle the mode of application of
the [arbitration] provisions [by mutual agreement] . . . , including the mini-
mum information necessary for each competent authority to undertake
substantive consideration of the case. Such an agreement shall be con-
cluded before the date on which unresolved issues in a [MAP] case are
first eligible to be submitted to arbitration.”346 This mode of application
may be changed from time to time thereafter.347
Article 19(11) allows a Party to “reserve the right to replace the two-
year period set forth in [Article 19(1)(b)] with a three-year period”348 for
the purposes of applying Part VI to its Covered Tax Agreements.
Under Article 19(12), a Party may reserve the right to exclude from
arbitration issues with respect to which a decision has been rendered by a
court or administrative tribunal of either Contracting Jurisdiction.349
First, ”any unresolved issue arising from a [MAP] case shall not be submit-
ted to arbitration, if a decision on this issue has already been rendered by
a court or administrative tribunal of either Contracting Jurisdiction.”350
Second, the arbitration process shall terminate, if a court or administrative
tribunal decision is rendered during the arbitration process.351 The reason
is that some jurisdictions do not permit a mutual agreement concluded by
the competent authority to override the decision of domestic court or ad-
ministrative tribunal, either as a matter of law or practice.352
343. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. (4)(b).
344. Id., art. 19(5) – (7).
345. Id., art. 19(8) – (9).
346. Id., art. 19(10).
347. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 230.
348. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 19(11).
349. Id., art. 19(12).
350. Id., art. 19(12)(a).
351. Id., art. 19(12)(b).
352. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 232.
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2.10.3 Appointment of Arbitrators
Although Article 20 sets out detailed default rules for the appoint-
ment and qualifications of arbitrators, the competent authorities may mu-
tually agree on different rules, either generally or with respect to a
particular case.353
“The arbitration panel consist of three individual members with ex-
pertise or experience in international tax matters.”354 “Each competent
authority shall appoint one panel member within 60 days of the date of
request for arbitration.”355 The two members shall then, “within 60 days
of the latter of their appointments, appoint a third member who is not a
national or resident of either Contracting Jurisdiction to serve as Chair of
the panel.”356 Each member must maintain her or his impartiality and in-
dependence of the arbitrators through the arbitration proceedings.357
If the competent authority fails to appoint a panel member, or if the
two initial members fail to appoint the Chair, within the specified or
agreed time periods, the highest ranking official of the OECD Centre for
Tax Policy and Administration that is not a national of either Contracting
Jurisdiction, shall appoint the vacant member or the Chair respectively.358
2.10.4 Confidentiality of Arbitration Proceedings
Confidential information in arbitration proceeding is not supposed to
be leaked without due authorization process.359 Article 21 is intended to
ensure smooth arbitration proceedings without undermining the confiden-
tiality of the MAP.360
The “information received by the arbitration panel or prospective ar-
bitrators and information that the competent authorities receive from the
arbitration panel shall be considered information [ ] exchanged [under the
exchange of information and administrative assistance provisions of the
Covered Tax Agreement]”.361 “The competent authorities . . . shall ensure
that [panel] members and their staff agree in writing . . . to treat any infor-
mation relating to the arbitration proceeding consistently with the confi-
dentiality and nondisclosure [requirements].362 . . .The consequences of
breach of confidentiality will be determined under the agreement terms
and the domestic laws of the Contracting Jurisdictions.363
353. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 20(1); OECD MLI Explanatory Statement,
supra note 24, ¶ 234.
354. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 20(2)(a).
355. Id., art. 20(2)(b).
356. Id.
357. Id. art. 20(2)(c).
358. Id., art. 20(3).
359. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 238.
360. See id.
361. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 21(1).
362. Id., art. 21(2).
363. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 239.
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2.10.5 Resolution of a Case Prior to the Conclusion of the Arbitration
Given that arbitration is the last resort for the disputes between the
competent authorities arising from MAP cases,364 and recognizing the sig-
nificance of the taxpayer’s autonomy, article 22 provides that if the compe-
tent authorities reach a mutual agreement to resolve the case, or if the
taxpayer withdraws either its request for arbitration or MAP during the
arbitration process, the MAP and the arbitration procedure with respect
to such case shall terminate.365
2.10.6 Type of Arbitration Process
To expedite the arbitration process, article 23 offers the “final offer”
approach and the “independent opinion” approach as default types.366
However, the competent authorities may mutually agree on different
rules.367
Under the “final offer” approach, “the competent authorities [ ] shall
[each] submit to the panel . . . a proposed resolution which addresses all
unresolved issue(s) in the case, . . . [but including only] the disposition of
specific monetary amounts [ ] or [ ]the maximum rate of tax charged pur-
suant to  the Covered Tax Agreement.”368 Where the unresolved issues
include threshold questions, “such as whether an individual is a resident or
whether a permanent establishment exists, the competent authorities may
submit alternative proposed resolutions . . . contingent on resolution of
[the unresolved] threshold questions”.369 Each competent authority may
submit a supporting position paper or a reply submission in response to
the proposed resolution and supporting position paper submitted by the
other competent authority.370 The panel shall select one of the proposed
resolutions, and shall not include a rationale or any other explanation of
the decision.371
A Party unwilling to accept the “final offer” approach may adopt the
“independent opinion” approach.372 Each competent authority shall pro-
vide all panel members with any information necessary for the arbitration
decision .373 The panel shall decide the issues pursuant to the applicable
provisions of the Covered Tax Agreement and, subject to these provisions,
of the domestic laws of the Contracting Jurisdictions.374 The panel shall
also consider any other sources identified by mutual agreement of the
364. Id., ¶ 240.
365. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 22.
366. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶¶ 242, 246.
367. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 23(1).
368. Id., art. 23(1)(a).
369. Id.
370. Id., art. 23(1)(b).
371. Id., art. 23(1)(c).
372. Id., art. 23(2).
373. Id., art. 23(2)(a).
374. Id., art. 23(2)(b).
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competent authorities .375 The decision shall indicate the sources of law
relied upon and the reasoning which led to its result.376
The arbitration decision shall be delivered to the competent authori-
ties in writing but will not have any precedential value.377
Where two Parties prefer different types of arbitration processes, the
competent authorities shall endeavor to reach agreement on the type of
arbitration process that shall apply with respect to all cases arising under
that Covered Tax Agreement.378 Until such an agreement is reached, arti-
cle 19 shall not apply.379
A Party may choose to apply article 23(5) “with respect to its Covered
Tax Agreements.”380 The competent authorities, prior to the beginning of
arbitration proceedings, should ensure that each taxpayer presenting the
case and their advisors sign a confidentiality agreement.381 A material
breach of the nondisclosure agreement after the request for arbitration
and before the panel has delivered its decision shall result in the termina-
tion of the MAP and the arbitration proceedings on the case.382 However,
Parties may opt out of article 23(5).383 A Party choosing to apply article
23(5) may reserve the right for Part VI not to apply with respect to all
Covered Tax Agreements with the reserving Contracting Jurisdiction.384
Articles 23(4) though article 23(7) are intended to encourage the best
practice of confidentiality.385 Where Parties disagree on the significance of
confidentiality, Parties considering confidentiality essential may opt out of
arbitration entirely if a Party opts out of the nondisclosure rule.386
2.10.7 Agreement on a Different Resolution
Article 24 permits both Contracting Jurisdictions to choose to apply
an optional provision, which allows the competent authorities to depart
from the arbitration decision and to agree on a different resolution within
three calendar months after the decision has been delivered to them.387
Given that such a provision would be unlikely to be applied where the
“final offer” approach is used, Parties may apply article 24 only to its Cov-
375. Id.
376. Id., art. 23(2)(c).
377. Id.
378. Id., art. 23(3).
379. Id.
380. Id., art. 23(4).
381. Id., art. 23(5).
382. Id.
383. Id., art. 23(6).
384. Id. art. 23(7).
385. See OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶¶ 250-251.
386. Id. ¶ 251.
387. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 24.
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ered Tax Agreements for which the “independent opinion” approach
applies.388
2.10.8 Costs of Arbitration Proceedings
Under article 25, costs of arbitration proceedings “shall be borne by
the Contracting Jurisdictions in a manner to be settled by mutual agree-
ment between the competent authorities . . . .”389 “In the absence of such
agreement, each Contracting Jurisdiction shall bear its own expenses and
those of its appointed [arbitrator]”.390 “The cost of the chair . . . and other
expenses associated with the conduct of the arbitration proceedings shall
be borne by the Contracting Jurisdictions in equal shares.”391
2.10.9 Compatibility
The compatibility clause in article 26 clarifies that Part VI
[S]hall apply in place or in the absence of provisions of a Covered
Tax Agreement that provide for arbitration of unresolved issues
arising from a [MAP] case. Each Party that chooses to apply Part
VI shall notify the Depositary [accordingly] . . . . Where two Con-
tracting Jurisdictions have made [such] a notification . . . , that
provision shall be replaced by [Part VI] as between those Con-
tracting Jurisdictions.392
To avoid duplicative arbitration efforts,393 “any unresolved issue aris-
ing from a [MAP] case . . .  shall not be submitted to arbitration [under
Part VI] if an arbitration panel or similar body has previously been set up
[with respect to the issue under another] bilateral or multilateral conven-
tion that provides for mandatory binding arbitration [for] unresolved is-
sues . . .”.394
Nothing in Part VI is intended to “affect the fulfillment of wider obli-
gations with respect to the arbitration of unresolved issues arising in the
context of a [MAP] resulting from other conventions to which the Con-
tracting Jurisdictions are or will become parties.”395
“A Party may preserve the right for . . . Part [VI] not to apply with
respect to one or more identified Covered Tax Agreements . . . that al-
388. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 252.
389. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 25.




393. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 257.
394. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 26(2).
395. Id., art. 26(3).
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ready provide for mandatory binding arbitration of unresolved issues aris-
ing from a [MAP] case.”396
2.11 Final Provisions of the MLI
2.11.1 Signature and Ratification, Acceptance, or Approval
As of December 31, 2016, the MLI was open for signature by all
States, three listed jurisdictions, and any other non-State jurisdiction au-
thorized to become a Party by consensus of Parties and Signatories. Signa-
ture of the MLI shall be followed by ratification, acceptance, or
approval.397
2.11.2 Reservations
Article 28 (1) lists twenty-one authorized reservations by reference to
the provision in which they are set out.398 With the exception of reserva-
tions to Part VI, these are the only reservations which may be made under
the MLI.399
To provide Parties committing to arbitration with flexibility to tailor
the scope of cases based on their domestic policies,400 article 28(2) permits
any Party that chooses to apply Part VI to formulate one or more reserva-
tions as to the scope of cases eligible for arbitration under Part VI.401 Res-
ervations are subject to acceptance.402
Article 28(3) clarifies the symmetric effect (i.e., reciprocal application)
of reservations made under article 28(1) or (2) on the application of the
relevant provisions of the MLI between the reserving Party and the other
Parties.403 “Unless explicitly provided otherwise . . . , a reservation will
modify . . . the [relevant] provisions of the Convention” as between the
reserving Party and all other Parties to the Convention in a symmetric
way.404
Article 28(4) requires the State Party responsible for the international
relations of a jurisdiction or territory to deposit a separate list of reserva-
tions for that jurisdiction or territory, which may be different from the
State Party’s own list of reservations.405
Articles 28(5) through (7) impose the timing requirements for making
reservations.406 A provisional list of reservations shall be provided to the
396. Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent
BEPSId., art. 26(4).
397. Id., art. 27.
398. Id., art. 28(1).
399. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 264.
400. Id., ¶ 265.
401. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 28(2).
402. Id., art. 28(2)(b).
403. Id., art. 28(3).
404. Id.
405. Id., art. 28(4).
406. Id., art. 28(5) – (7).
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Depositary at the time of signature,407 and a final list of reservations shall
be provided at the time of the deposit of the instrument of ratification,
acceptance, or approval.408 It is permitted for a final list of reservations to
be provided to the Depositary at the time of signature.409 If reservations
are not made at the time of signature, a provisional list of expected reser-
vations shall be provided to the Depositary at that time.410
Under article 28(8), when reservations are made under the fifteen
types of listed provisions, an exhaustive list of the Covered Tax Agree-
ments which are within the scope of the reservation as defined in the rele-
vant provision must be provided.411
To encourage comprehensive modifications of the Covered Tax
Agreements by the MLI, article 28(9) permits a Party to withdraw a reser-
vation or replace it with a reservation which is more limited in scope by
notifying the Depositary.412 Articles 28(9)(a) and (b) set out the dates on
which such a withdrawal or replacement of a reservation will take
effect.413
2.11.3 Notifications
Article 29 sets forth detailed requirements for the notification proce-
dure.414 The twenty categories of notification specified in the MLI shall be
made either at the time of signature or when depositing the instrument of
ratification, acceptance, or approval.415 The State Party responsible for the
international relations of the jurisdiction or territory shall provide a list of
notifications with respect to that jurisdiction or territory, which may be
different from the State Party’s own list of notifications.416
“If notifications are made at the time of signature, they shall be con-
firmed upon deposit of the instrument of ratification, acceptance, or ap-
proval, unless the document containing the notifications explicitly specifies
that it is to be considered definitive.”417 “If notifications are not made at
the time of signature, a provisional list of expected notifications shall be
provided at that time.”418
The list of agreements described in  article 2(1)(a)(ii) may be ex-
tended at any time by notifying the Depositary.419 If the agreement falls
407. Id., art. 28(7).
408. Id., art. 28(6).
409. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 276.
410. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 28(7).
411. Id., art. 28(8).
412. Id., art. 28(9).
413. Id., art. 28(9)(a), 28(9)(b).
414. Id., art. 29.
415. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 292.
416. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 29(2).
417. Id., art. 29(3).
418. Id., art. 29(4).
419. Id., art. 29(5).
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within the scope of any of the reservations made by the Party listed in
article 28(8), the Party must specify this in this notification.420 The Party
shall also specify any additional required notifications to reflect the inclu-
sion of additional agreements.421 “If the extension results for the first time
in the inclusion of a tax agreement entered into by or on behalf of a [non-
State jurisdiction or territory] . . . , [the responsible Party] shall specify [at
that time] any reservations or notifications applicable to Covered Tax
Agreements.”422 On the date on which a newly added agreement becomes
a Covered Tax Agreement, “Article 35 . . . shall govern the date on which
the modifications to the Covered Tax Agreement shall have effect.”423
Parties may make additional notifications under articles 29(1)(b)
through (s) by notifying the Depositary.424 Articles 29(6)(a) and (b) clar-
ify when such additional notifications will take effect.425 The provision
mirrors article 28(9) relating to the date on which the withdrawal or re-
placement of a reservation will take effect.426
2.11.4 Subsequent Modifications of Covered Tax Agreements
Recognizing the necessity of subsequent treaty modification,427 article
30 provides that “the provisions in [the MLI] . . . are without prejudice to
subsequent modifications to a Covered Tax Agreement which may be
agreed to by the Contracting Jurisdictions.”428
2.11.5 Conference of the Parties
Article 31 authorizes the Parties to “convene a Conference of the Par-
ties for the purposes of taking any decisions or exercising any functions as
may be required or appropriate under the provisions of . . . [the MLI]”.429
“Any Party may request a Conference by communicating a request to the
Depositary.”430 The Depositary will then convene a Conference provided
that the request is supported by one-third of the Parties within six calendar
months of the communication by the Depositary of the request.431
2.11.6 Interpretation and Implementation
Under article 32, “any question[s] arising from the interpretation or





424. Id., art. 29(6).
425. Id., art. 29(6)(a), 29(6)(b).
426. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 307.
427. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 310.
428. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 30.
429. Id., art. 31(1).
430. Id., art. 31(3).
431. Id.
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determined under the relevant provision(s) of [that] . . . Agreement [it-
self] . . . [and] any questions arising as to the interpretation or implementa-
tion of . . . [the MLI] may be addressed either by a Conference of the
Parties” or by the agreement between the competent authorities.432
2.11.7 Amendment
Article 33 permits any Party to propose an amendment to the MLI
“by submitting the proposed amendment to the Depositary.”433 “A Con-
ference of the Parties may be convened to consider the proposed
amendment.”434
2.11.8 Entry into Force
Under article 34, the MLI “shall enter into force on the first day of the
month following the expiration of a period of three calendar months be-
ginning on the date of deposit of the fifth instrument of ratification, ac-
ceptance, or approval.”435 “For each Signatory ratifying, accepting, or
approving . . . [the MLI] after the. . . [fifth deposit], . . . [the MLI] shall
enter into force on the first day of the month following the expiration of a
period of three calendar months beginning on the date of the deposit by
such Signatory of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, or
approval.”436
2.11.9 Entry into Effect
Article 35 sets out when the provisions of the MLI shall take effect in
each Contracting Jurisdiction with respect to two categories of taxes which
fall within the scope of a Covered Tax Agreement.437
Article 35(1)(a) addresses the entry into effect of provisions of the
MLI “with respect to taxes withheld at source on amounts paid or credited
to non-residents”.438 The first taxes for which the MLI shall have effect
are those for which “the event giving rise to such taxes occurs on or after
the first day of the next calendar year that begins on or after the latest of
the dates on which the [MLI] enters into force for each Contracting Juris-
diction . . .”.439
Article 35(1)(b) addresses the entry into effect of provisions of the
MLI “with respect to all other taxes levied by a Contracting Jurisdic-
tion”.440 Unless the Contracting Jurisdictions agree to apply a shorter pe-
riod, the first taxes for which provisions of the MLI will enter into effect
432. Id., art. 32.
433. Id., art. 33(1).
434. Id., art. 33(2).
435. Id., art. 34(1).
436. Id., art. 34(2).
437. Id., art. 35(1).
438. Id., art. 35(1)(a).
439. Id.
440. Id., art. 35(1)(b).
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are those levied “with respect to taxable periods beginning on or after the
expiration of a period of six calendar months from the latest of the dates
on which the MLI enters into force for each  of the Contracting Jurisdic-
tions . . .”.441
To address the situations in which the taxable period does not follow
the calendar year in some Contracting Jurisdictions, article 35(2) permits a
Party to “choose to substitute “taxable period” for “calendar year”” solely
for the purposes of its own asymmetrical application of article 35(1)(a)
and (5)(a).442
To allow the MLI to enter into effect only after the start of a calendar
year in certain Contracting Jurisdictions,443 article 35(3) permits a Party to
replace the reference to “taxable periods beginning on or after the expira-
tion of a period” with a reference to “taxable periods beginning on or after
1 January of the next calendar year beginning on or after the expiration of
a period” solely for the purposes of its own asymmetrical application of
article 35(1)(b) and (5)(b).444
To ensure that the MAP provisions apply as soon as possible,445 arti-
cle 35(4) clarifies that article 16 “shall have effect with respect to a Cov-
ered Tax Agreement for a case presented to the competent authority on or
after the latest of the dates on which the MLI enters into force for each of
the Contracting Jurisdiction”, except for cases that were ineligible to be
presented prior to the modification of Covered Tax Agreement by the
MLI, regardless of the taxable period to which the case relates.446 How-
ever, a Party may opt out of article 35(4),447 in which case the entry into
effect of article 16 for its Covered Tax Agreement will be governed by
article 35(1) through (3).448
Article 35(5) provides for the entry into effect in each Contracting
Jurisdiction of the MLI’s provisions for new Covered Tax Agreements re-
sulting from an extension of the list of agreements notified under article
2(1)(a)(ii).449 The time periods run similarly to those described in article
35(1) in many respects.450
Article 35(7) permits a Party to reserve the right to delay the date of
entry into effect of the provisions of the MLI, of the withdrawal or re-
placement of a reservation, of an additional notification with respect to
that Covered Tax Agreement, or of Part VI (Arbitration), until that Party
441. Id.
442. Id., art. 35(2).
443. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 331.
444. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 35(3).
445. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 333.
446. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 35(4).
447. Id., art. 35(6).
448. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 337.
449. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 35(5).
450. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 335.
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has completed its internal procedures for this purpose.451 In such cases,
the default specific rules on entry into effect would apply as from the date
30 days after the Depositary has received the latest notification by each
reserving Contracting Jurisdiction that it has completed its internal proce-
dures for the entry into effect of the provisions of the MLI with respect to
that specific Covered Tax Agreement.452
2.11.10 Entry into Effect of Part VI
Article 36 exclusively addresses the entry into effect of the provisions
of Part VI, notwithstanding the provisions of article 28(9) (addressing the
withdrawal of a reservation), article 29(6) (addressing additional notifica-
tions), and article 35 (other than paragraph 7) (addressing the entry into
effect of the Convention).453
Under article 36(1), Part VI shall take effect with respect to cases
presented to the competent authority . . . on or after the later of the dates
on which the [MLI] enters into force for each of the Contracting Jurisdic-
tions”.454 However, to allow competent authorities to reasonably defer the
eligibility of existing cases until they have agreed on the mode of applica-
tion of Part VI, Part VI shall take effect “with respect to cases presented
to the competent authority [ ] prior to the later of the dates on which the
[MLI] enters into force for each of the Contracting Jurisdictions [ ], on the
date when both Contracting Jurisdictions have notified the Depositary
that they have reached mutual agreement [on the application of Part VI],
along with information regarding the date or dates on which such cases
shall be considered to have been presented to the competent authority . . .
according to the terms of that mutual agreement.455
Recognizing that the arbitration eligibility deferral under article
36(1)(b) is unlikely to alleviate the challenging resource constraints for
Contracting Jurisdictions with a large backlog of cases to apply Part VI
effectively to those cases, article 36(2) permits Parties to “reserve the right
for Part VI to apply to an [existing MAP] case . . . only to the extent that
[both] competent authorities agree that it will apply to that specific
case”.456
Articles 36(3) through 36(5) address the entry into effect of Part VI in
the case in which a Party begins applying Part VI to a Covered Tax Agree-
ment only after incorporating a new Covered Tax Agreement into the ex-
tended list of agreements, withdrawing or replacing a reservation made
“under article [26(4)] pursuant to [article 28(9)], or the withdrawal of  an
451. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 35(7).
452. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 35(5); OECD MLI Explanatory Statement,
supra note 24, ¶ 338.
453. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 35(6).
454. Id., art. 36(1)(a).
455. Id., art. 36(1)(b).
456. Id., art. 36(2).
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objection to a reservation made under article [28(2)]”.457 In all such cases,
the date of entry into effect is based on the date of communication by the
Depositary of the notification of the extension of the list of agreements,
withdrawal or replacement of reservation, or withdrawal of objection,
rather than the date of entry into force of the MLI.458
2.11.11 Withdrawal
Article 37 permits any Party to withdraw from the MLI at any time.459
In cases where the MLI has entered into force with respect to all Con-
tracting Jurisdictions to a Covered Tax Agreement before the date on
which a Party’s withdrawal becomes effective, that Covered Tax Agree-
ment shall remain as modified by this Convention.460 The rationale is that
a unilateral withdrawal from the MLI does not have any retrospective ef-
fects, and would not reverse the modifications already made to the Cov-
ered Tax Agreement.461
2.11.12 Relation with Protocols
Article 38 provides that the MLI may be supplemented by one or
more protocols.462 To become a party to a protocol, a State or jurisdiction
must be a Party to the MLI.463 “A Party to . . . [the MLI] is not be bound
by a protocol unless it becomes a party to the protocol in accordance with
its provisions.”464
2.11.13 Depositary
Article 39 defined the role of the Depositary.465 The Secretary-Gen-
eral of the OECD shall be the Depositary of the MLI and any proto-
cols.466 “The Depositary shall notify the  Parties and Signatories within
one calendar month” of the specified list of acts, notifications, or commu-
nications in relation to the MLI.467 The Depositary shall maintain publicly
available lists of Covered Tax Agreements, reservations made by the Par-
ties, and notifications made by the Parties.468
457. Id., art. 36(3) – 36(5).
458. Id.
459. Id., art. 37(1).
460. Id., art. 37(2).
461. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 353.
462. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24 art. 38(1).
463. Id., art. 38(2).
464. Id., art. 38(3).
465. Id., art. 39.
466. Id., art. 39(1).
467. Id., art. 39(2).
468. Id., art. 39(3).
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3. Why Are Tax Treaties Necessary?
Before we proceed to evaluate the MLI, it is helpful to raise a more
fundamental question: Why are tax treaties needed in the twenty-first
century?
Traditionally, tax treaties were thought to be needed to prevent classi-
cal “juridical” double taxation, in which both the source and the residence
jurisdictions taxed the same taxpayer on the same income, one on the ba-
sis of source (in rem) jurisdiction and the other on the basis of residence
(in personam) jurisdiction.469 This problem was the reason the League of
Nation drafted the first model “convention for the prevention of double
taxation” in 1927 – 28.470 But as Stanley Surrey already pointed out in
1957 and as Tsilly Dagan has emphasized more recently, tax treaties are
not needed to prevent double taxation because almost all residence coun-
tries grant relief from double taxation by way of credit or exemption uni-
laterally, without the need for a treaty.471 Other double taxation situations
(dual residence, source/source) are not always resolved even with a tax
treaty in place.
As Dagan also pointed out, the main function of tax treaties is to en-
force the “Benefits Principle”, i.e., the compromise reached in the 1920s
between the tax claims of residence and source jurisdictions.472 Under the
Benefits Principle, which is incorporated into every tax treaty, active (busi-
ness) income should be taxed primarily at source as long as the taxpayer
meets the “Permanent Establishment” threshold, while passive (invest-
ment) income should be taxed primarily at residence.473 Since without a
treaty both active and passive income are taxed at source with relief
granted by the residence jurisdiction, the main function of the treaty is to
shift the right to tax passive income from source to residence by limiting
withholding tax rates. Under the OECD model, withholding taxes are lim-
ited to fifteen percent for dividends, ten percent for interest and zero per-
469. For example, Article 1 of the Mexico and London Models states that “[t]he present
Convention is designed to prevent double taxation in the case of taxpayers of the contracting
states.” Model Bilateral Convention for the Prevention of International Double Taxation of
Income and Fiscal Evasion, supra note 10, art. I (Mexico Draft); Model Bilateral Convention
on the Prevention of the Double Taxation of Income and Property, supra note 11, art. I
(London Draft).
470. MICHAEL KOBETSKY, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION OF PERMANENT ESTABLISH-
MENTS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 106 – N 108 (2011).
471. Tsilly Dagan, The Tax Treaties Myth, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 939, 939 (2000);
Stanley S. Surrey, The Pakistan Tax Treaty and “Tax Sparing”, 11 Nat’l Tax J. 156, 156
(1958).
472. Dagan, supra note 471, at 941 – 942.
473. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Haiyan Xu, Evaluating BEPS: A Reconsideration of the
Benefits Principle and Proposal for UN Oversight, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 185, 188 (2016). On
the benefits principle and its origins, see REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, ADVANCED INTRODUC-
TION TO INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW ch. 1 (2015); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Taxa-
tion of Electronic Commerce, 52 TAX L. REV. 507 (1997); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The
Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301
(1996).
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cent for royalties, capital gains and “other income” (e.g., payments on
derivatives).474 That leaves the residence country with the right to tax such
payments without granting too much foreign tax credit.
Dagan goes on to argue that this means that tax treaties are helpful
among developed countries because the investment flows are reciprocal,
but injurious to developing countries.475 Others (including the developing
countries) have rejected this argument because they believe tax treaties
are helpful in attracting investment and guaranteeing some measure of tax
stability to the investors.476
But are tax treaties necessary to enforce the Benefits Principle? It can
be argued that the answer is no under conditions of tax competition. Econ-
omists have long argued that a small, open economy should not tax in-
bound investment because the tax will cause the investment to either go
elsewhere or be shifted to source country taxpayers, who can be taxed
directly.477 The latter is not entirely convincing because it may be adminis-
tratively easier for the source country to levy withholding taxes even if the
burden is shifted, but the argument that the investment will go elsewhere
is generally convincing, especially for interest but increasingly also for div-
idends (capital gains cannot usually be taxed by withholding).
Under conditions of tax competition to attract investment, there are
two possible scenarios. The first and more common is that the same return
can be earned in many places and is therefore subject to tax competition.
For interest that is clearly the case and that is why after the United States
unilaterally eliminated its withholding on interest in 1984,478 most coun-
tries went along.479 No tax treaty is needed to reduce withholding on port-
folio interest, while “direct” interest among related parties is better
policed by transfer pricing and thin capitalization rules.
In the case of dividends, it can perhaps be argued that an investment is
more unique, but (a) it is hard to distinguish dividends from interest, espe-
cially if derivatives that can be used to convert equity to debt are not taxed
at source, and (b) the uniqueness of equity investments is declining as mul-
tinationals become more similar to each other under globalization. In ad-
dition, dividends are optional and not deductible, so it is not clear what
474. OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital arts. 10–13, 21 (July 15,
2014).
475. See Dagan, supra note 471.
476. See, e.g., Arjan Lejour, The Foreign Investment Effect of Tax Treaties, (CPB Neth.
Bureau for Econ. Policy Analysis, Working Paper No. 14/03, 2014), http://www.eesc.europa
.eu/resources/docs/2014-the-foreign-investment-effects-of-tax-treaties_oxford-univ-centre-
for-business-taxation.pdf.
477. Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka, Capital Income Taxation in the Globalized World,
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 10630, 2004), http://www.nber.org/pa-
pers/w10630.pdf.
478. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 127(a), 98 Stat. 494, 648-
50 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 871(h) (1994)).
479. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the
Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1581 (2000).
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function is achieved by having a withholding tax on dividends, and a tax
treaty should not be needed to eliminate such taxes.
This leaves royalties, where the tax treaty is the only effective way to
reduce withholding tax. But royalties from intellectual property generally
represent economic “rents,” i.e., unique returns from specific assets, and in
that case, it is hard to see the rationale for reducing the withholding tax
because the investor cannot earn the returns elsewhere. Admittedly, mul-
tinationals have become extremely adept at locating IP in low-taxed juris-
dictions and using deductible royalties to shift profits there. But that is
precisely why royalties should be subject to full withholding tax rates by
source countries (or alternatively not be deductible). Most royalties in any
case are paid within multinationals and represent active income that
should be taxed at source.
Thus, it can be argued that treaties are not needed to enforce the Ben-
efits Principle under conditions of tax competition because the income can
either be earned somewhere else, in which case the competition will lead
to unilateral erosion of the withholding tax, or not, in which case the with-
holding tax should not be reduced.
But what about the function of tax treaties to attract investment and
guarantee tax stability? While the empirical literature does suggest that
tax treaties help investment, the same function can be achieved by bilat-
eral investment treaties (BITs).480 BITs have two advantages over tax
treaties: they are closer to being functionally multilateral because they
contain a “most favored nation” (MFN) clause,481 and they have much
stronger dispute resolution mechanisms.482 If a source country changes its
tax rules in a way that injures investors, they can force it into binding arbi-
tration under the BIT, as the government of India found out recently
when it overturned its own Supreme Court to tax Vodafone
retroactively.483
So can we just dispense with tax treaties? The question may seem too
theoretical to be worth pursuing. However, current developments, and es-
480. See Peter H. Egger et. al, The Impact of Endogenous Tax Treaties on Foreign Di-
rect Investment: Theory and Evidence, 39 CANADIAN J. ECON. 901 (2006); Mumtaz Hussain
Shah & Saba Qayyum, Impact of Double Taxation Treaties on Inward FDI in Latin American
and Caribbean Developing Countries, 7 BUS. & ECON. REV. 1 (2015); Eric Neumayer, Do
Double Taxation Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries?, 43 J.
DEV. STUD. 1501 (2007); Bruce A. Blonigen & Ronald B. Davies, The Effects of Bilateral Tax
Treaties on U.S. FDI Activity (Univ. of Or. Econ. Dep’t Working Paper No. 2001-14, 2011),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=445980; K. V. Bhanu Murthy & Niti Bhasin, The Impact of Bilateral
Tax Treaties on FDI Inflows: The Case of India (March 18, 2013) (unpublished manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2234966.
481. MFN clauses link investment agreements by ensuring that parties to one treaty
provide treatment no less favorable than the treatment they provide investors under other
treaties. See, e.g., German Model Treaty 1998, art. 3.
482. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Dispute Settlement: Investor-
State, U.N. Doc UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/30, at 41 (May 2003) (noting that in a survey of 335 BITs
in force in 1992, 334 contained provisions for arbitration).
483. See Stephanie Soong Johnston, Vodafone Goes To International Court Over Indian
Tax Dispute, 82 TAX NOTES INT’L 41 (2016).
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pecially the proliferation of new taxes designed to avoid treaty limitations
such as the UK “diverted profits tax” and similar enactments elsewhere,484
raise the possibility that the whole bilateral tax treaty network will col-
lapse, and perhaps that is no great loss. Countries will either tax at the
source or not, depending on whether the tax competition market allows
them to do so. Double taxation will be avoided unilaterally, and in those
cases in which source countries can tax, the BIT network (which is larger
than the tax treaty network) will prevent abuses by the source country.
However, tax treaties in the twenty-first century have another func-
tion: they can serve to enforce the other principle underlying the ITR, the
Single Tax Principle. The Single Tax Principle is the idea that underlies the
OECD BEPS project, namely that cross-border income should not be sub-
ject to double taxation but also not to double non-taxation.485 This means
that source taxation should generally not be reduced unless residence tax-
ation is in place.486
For active income, the Single Tax Principle can be achieved without a
treaty because if this income is not taxed at source, residence jurisdictions
can tax it under “controlled foreign corporation” (CFC) rules without a
tax treaty (in fact, tax treaties have been used in some cases to undermine
CFC rules).487 But for passive income, in the absence of a tax treaty net-
work, reduction of withholding taxes are achieved unilaterally by tax com-
petition without any assurance that the income will be taxed at source. The
prime culprit is the U.S. portfolio interest exemption from 1984, which has
led not just to massive capital flight from developing countries to the “tax
haven” United States, but also to U.S. residents pretending to be foreign
and investing into the United States through “incorporated pocketbooks”
in the Caymans and friendly Swiss banks.488 This practice is illegal but
hard to prevent in the absence of withholding or information exchange,
and the latter can only be achieved by treaty.
For individual taxpayers, the needed exchange of information to en-
force residence based taxation can be achieved by special treaties like bi-
lateral tax information exchange agreements (TIEAs) and the new
484. On these developments see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Three Steps Forward, One Step
Back? Reflections on “Google Taxes” and the Destination-Based Corporate Tax, 2 Nordic Tax
J. 69 (2016).
485. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Haiyan Xu, supra note 473, at 208 (2016); see OECD 2017
MLI, supra note 24, pmbl. See also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, supra note 28, at 12–22; Daniel
Shaviro, The Two Faces of the Single Tax Principle (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Working Pa-
pers, Paper 419, 2015), http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1421&context=nyu_
lewp.
486. See Reuven Avi-Yonah, Who Invented the Single Tax Principle? An Essay on the
History of US Treaty Policy, 59 N. Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 305 (2015).
487. Marcellin N. Mbwa-Mboma, France-Switzerland Treaty Overrides CFC Regime,
French Tax Court Rules, 27 TAX NOTES INT’L 143 (2002).
488. Reuven Avi-Yonah, What Goes Around Comes Around: Why the US is Responsi-
ble for Capital Flight (And What It Can Do About It) (Jan. 23, 2013) (Univ. of Mich. Pub.
Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 307, 2013), https://ssrn.com/
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Multilateral Agreement on Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters
(MAATM).489 These instruments do not require a full-fledged tax treaty,
although in our opinion they are imperfect and it would be preferable if
the United States and the EU could agree to reinstate withholding taxes
on interest and only reduce them by treaty (so that only residents in coun-
tries that tax income and exchange information could benefit from re-
duced withholding tax rates). Since portfolio interest is always earned in
developed countries, the cooperation of tax havens is not needed to
achieve this result.
But for corporate taxpayers, the tax treaty network is needed to im-
plement the single tax principle. That can be seen from the experience of
countries that allow one of their treaties to be abused by not enforcing a
limitation on benefit principles, so any taxpayer can come and use the
treaty. The result is a reduction in source taxes on active income (business
profits, royalties, direct dividends) without assurance that the income is
taxed at residence.
The whole point of the BEPS project and the MLI is to enforce the
single tax principle by ensuring that source taxation will apply in situations
where there is no residence taxation because of tax arbitrage or the use of
pass-through entities.490 And that is why in the absence of the MLI trea-
ties could become useless, but with the MLI they are still quite useful.
A United States example can be used to illustrate this point. Before
1984, investors into the United States used the Netherlands Antilles treaty
as a way of deriving interest, dividends, and royalties from U.S. sources at
reduced rates.491 The Antilles treaty was a “treaty with the world,” like
the Russia-Cyprus or India-Mauritius treaties (although the latter was re-
cently revised).492 But in 1984 the United States unilaterally terminated
the Antilles treaty and at the same time started inserting Limitation on
Benefits (LOB) clauses in all its treaties.493 LOBs are designed to enforce
the Single Tax principle, and they have become an essential and non-nego-
tiable element in U.S. treaty practice and now through the MLI OECD
treaty practice as well.
In the absence of treaties with LOBs, it is increasingly likely that cor-
porate taxpayers could derive not just interest but even royalties without
paying tax at source or at residence. That is the situation in Europe be-
cause of the EU Directives, which override the treaties.494 The MLI is
489. See Reuven Avi-Yonah & Gil Savir, IGAs vs. MAATM: Has Tax Bilateralism Out-
lived Its Usefulness? (Univ. of Mich. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper
No. 384, 2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2392702.
490. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 28; Reuven Avi-Yonah & Haiyan Xu, supra note 473.
491. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 28 at 14.
492. For a general discussion, see Leslie E. Papke, One-Way Treaty with the World: The
U.S. Withholding Tax and the Netherlands Antilles.7 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 295 (2000).
493. Avi-Yonah, supra note 486.
494. See Phillipe Freun & Kelly Stricklin-Coutinho, United Kingdom, in TAXATION OF
INTERCOMPANY DIVIDENDS UNDER TAX TREATIES AND EU LAW 984 (Guglielmo Maisto
ed., 2012); HM REVENUES & CUSTOMS, UK Residents with Foreign Income or Gains: Divi-
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designed to prevent this type of BEPS by requiring LOBs so that source
taxes are not reduced unless there is likely to be tax at residence. That is
what the treaties are needed for in the twenty-first century, and that is why
the MLI is such a useful addition.
3. A MFN CLAUSE FOR TAX TREATIES?
Now that the MLI has been adopted by most of the OECD and G20
(excluding the United States), what next?
A full-fledged multilateral tax convention remains an unlikely idea
even if the withholding tax rates and method for preventing double taxa-
tion are left for bilateral negotiations.495 But there may be another way to
create a de facto multilateral treaty: inserting a MFN clause into tax
treaties.496
BITs have MFN clauses.497 The effect has been that innovations in
any given BIT tend to spread automatically, and by now the BIT network
is close to a de facto multilateral one, despite the lack of consensus that
derailed the attempt to negotiate the multilateral investment agreement in
the 1990s.498
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The obvious difference between tax treaties and BITs is that tax trea-
ties directly affect revenues and therefore countries may resist MFNs be-
cause that will force them to give up revenue if investment flows differ
from one treaty partner to another.
But this argument is not entirely convincing. First, investment flows
can change under current treaties, and that does not deter countries from
entering treaties. They know that treaties can be renegotiated if the
change in flows upsets the treaty bargain.
Second, the knowledge that MFN exists can simply be incorporated in
treaty negotiations. Suppose the United States had MFN in its tax treaties
and that it did not wish to reduce its withholding tax rate on portfolio
dividends below fifteen percent. Knowing that MFN exists would simply
ensure that it sticks by this position because it knows that a lower rate will
spread to all existing treaties. On the other hand, suppose the United
States decided that the right rate for direct dividends is zero rather than
five percent. Having an MFN clause would mean this new negotiating po-
sition spreads automatically to all U.S. treaties without requiring opening
treaties to renegotiation.499
In the case of a country like the United States that already has treaties
with most of the countries that it wants to have treaties with, and that
already reduces most withholding taxes to zero by its existing treaties (the
U.S. model has zero for interest, royalties, capital gains and other income),
adopting MFN is unlikely to lead to significant revenue losses and can
make it easier to install innovations like the zero-tax rate for direct divi-
dends across the U.S. treaty network. It is likely that other OECD mem-
ber countries are in the same position.500 Developing countries may be
more reluctant, and should be free to avoid the MFN, but for the OECD
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Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital art. XXV, Can.-U.S., Sept. 26,
1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11087. The IBFD Tax Research Platform yields almost 250 treaties in force
that include MFN clauses.
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including the MFN clause in tax treaties would seem a logical next step
toward the ultimate goal of a full-fledged multilateral tax convention.
4. CONCLUSION: THE MLI AND THE FUTURE OF THE ITR
The MLI is an important innovation in international law. Hitherto,
international economic law was built primarily on bilateral treaties (e.g.,
tax treaties and BITs) or multilateral treaties (the WTO agreements). The
problem is that in some areas, like tax and investment, multilateral treaties
have proven hard to negotiate, but only a multilateral treaty can be
amended simultaneously by all its signatories.
The MLI provides an ingenious solution: a multilateral instrument
that automatically amends all the bilateral treaties of its signatories. If the
MLI succeeds, it can be a useful model in other areas, such as investment,
where a multilateral agreement was not successful but there is a growing
consensus about the need to adjust the terms of BITs to address investor
responsibilities and the definition of investment comprehensively.
Whether the MLI will succeed remains to be seen. While its adoption
by seventy countries (with more to come) is an achievement, the absence
of the United States is important, and other OECD members have agreed
to only a limited set of provisions. On the other hand, the MLI may prove
more appealing to developing countries because it enhances source-based
taxation and limits treaty shopping.
If the MLI is successfully adopted by the majority of taxing jurisdic-
tions, this will have implications for non-taxing jurisdictions as well. For
example, it is likely that the PPT will be used by courts in signatory coun-
tries to interpret treaties with non-signatory countries like the United
States if those countries have signaled their agreement with the single tax
principle embodied in the PPT by, for example, incorporating the LOB in
their tax treaties.
Even a limited MLI would be a step forward. The current tax reform
proposals in the United States pose a significant threat to the ITR, be-
cause they would sharply reduce the U.S. corporate effective tax rate to
attract investment from other jurisdictions.501 Countries that wish to limit
the damage would be wise to accede to the MLI this year and prevent a
massive race to the bottom that could ensue if the United States becomes
(from the perspective of the rest of the world) a giant tax haven.
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Dicing: The Structural Problems of the Tax Reform Framework (U of Michigan Law & Econ
Research Paper No. 17-015, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3048375.
